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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The reality in terms of operational competence has changed. The past tradition of assessing 
procedural compliance of the individual Air Traffic Controller is today challenged in a dynamic 
and intractable socio-technical system like Air Traffic Management. Changes in technology and 
complex system interdependencies, call for an enhanced understanding of the interaction and 
coupling between the human operator and the system. As the skill sets change, new competencies 
emerge and the assessment or measurement of these must follow. 
 
A study, using the framework of Grounded Theory, was conducted to explore the existing 
practice of the yearly competence assessment of Air Traffic Controllers. The purpose of this 
research was to examine if the compulsory competence assessment can be utilised as a means of 
transitioning from the individual centric approach that characterises today’s competence 
assessment, towards a system centric view where the interaction between the Air Traffic 
Controller and the wider system is incorporated. 
 
Sixteen semi-structured interviews, four of which were conducted as small focus group 
interviews, provided qualitative data for this research. 
 
The study found a need for calibrating the traditional view of competence to encompass the 
many new functions of normal work. An enhanced six stage competence model was derived 
from the research data to ensure an augmented emphasis on understanding the daily activities of 
work. The six elements of the competence model are: 
 
 Skill-based competence 
 Knowledge-based competence 
 Experience-based competence 
 Adaptive competence 
 Service-driven competence 
 Social competence 
 
The competence model represents a synthesis of individual and systemic based competence 
elements, as both approaches need to coexist within the concept of competence assessment. 
 
This study advocates the importance of recognising Air Traffic Controllers as system informants 
to gain a comprehensive picture of the complexity of operational work. Assessment of 
competence is only meaningful if one understands the contextual parameters and practices of 
normal work. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In April 2006, competence assessment of Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) became compulsory 
within the ECAC1 area. ESARR 52 was enacted from previously being a recommendation made 
in 2003 to a mandatory EU Directive (2006/23/EC). All member states, as well as their 
operational ATC units, had to implement and follow ESARR 5. It became a requirement to have; 
 
Approved procedures to ensure the ongoing competence of their air traffic 
controllers, including a mechanism, based on operational experience or a 
competence checking system, or a combination of both, whereby controllers are 
monitored or regularly tested to ensure they maintain their competence 
(EUROCONTROL, 2002, p.11) 
 
In many countries and for numerous Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), competence 
assessment was, and still is today, approached in the traditional way of observing procedure and 
rule compliance to ensure desired performance by the individual ATCO. Focus is predominantly 
placed on monitoring and identifying non-standard performance due to errors in techniques, 
mainly technical or judgmental (Bosk, 2003). Failure to perform competently as a professional, 
a.k.a. competence in doubt, will preclude the privileges associated with the license from being 
exercised, and the ATCO will consequently be suspended from carrying out operational work. 
 
The assessment of operational ATCO competence is commonly performed through the 
utilisation of either a dedicated check or as continuous assessment (EUROCONTROL, 2005). The 
dedicated check is a planned observation of the ATCO working with live traffic, in normal and 
representative traffic levels and complexity. The check is generally performed once a year and the 
monitoring timeframe varies from one hour up to several hours, depending upon traffic amount 
and unit work practices. Assessment can also run as a continuous assessment program, which 
entails assessing at regular intervals that are unknown to the ATCO. The continuous assessment 
can take place at any time and is in most cases conducted by a colleague, holding an assessor 
endorsement, who is also part of the normal working shift.  
 
The two approaches are not only very different in the way they are conducted; they are also 
problematic in comparison hence the philosophies are not the same. These approaches are 
characteristic of the classical safety paradigm where strict rule compliance is used as a way of 
ensuring organisational control. Weichbrodt defines it as a behaviourist approach to 
organisational safety (2015). There is however an alternative safety paradigm that suggest a 
change in focus from stringent compliance to understanding the reality of the real world.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if competence assessment can be utilised as a method, 
to enable the transition from the traditional Safety-I approach of constraining performance 
variability and adaptation, into monitoring, understanding and managing both as intended in the 
Safety-II philosophy. These reflections form the basis of the thesis and research question: 
 
Can competence assessment of air traffic controllers enable or facilitate a transition from 
Safety-I to Safety-II by recognising performance variability and adaptation? 
                                                 
 
1 ECAC's mission is promotion of the continued development of a safe, efficient and sustainable European air 
transport system. ECAC seeks to harmonise civil aviation policies and practices amongst its 44 Member States.  
 
2 ESARR 5 sets out the general safety requirements for all ATM services’ personnel responsible for safety related 
tasks within the provision of ATM services across the ECAC area 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Competence in Air Traffic Control 
 
The meaning and concept of competence is described elusively in ESARR 5 as “the required level 
of knowledge, skills, experience and where required, proficiency in English, to permit the safe and 
efficient provision of ATM services” (EUROCONTROL, 2002, p.8 – emphasis added).  
 
Assessment of knowledge, declarative memory, is commonly done through a theoretical test. It can 
be a written or computer based test, or alternatively as a constructed scenario interview. The 
purpose of the scenario interview is to confirm understanding of all key objectives, as well as 
target areas which were not observed during the practical part of the assessment. 
 
Skills, procedural memory, is assessed by monitoring the ATCO while working in position. The 
competence assessor is primarily observing the ATCO’s skill- and rule-based performance 
(Rasmussen, 1983) in situations ranging from routine to familiar, and with a cognitive attention 
spanning from automatic to conscious. The knowledge-based performance as described by 
Rasmussen arises during “unfamiliar situations, faced with an environment for which no know-
how or rules for control are available from previous encounters, the control of performance must 
move to a higher conceptual level, in which performance is goal-controlled and knowledge-
based” (p.259). In the event that an emergency occurs, or if the situation is deemed unfamiliar or 
unusual to such an extent that the competence assessor decides to assist in handling the traffic, 
the assessment is officially cancelled. Assessment of skill should only be conducted in traffic 
complexity considered normal or representative for the unit. 
 
ATCO operational experience is maintained in terms of competence by the following provisions 
within ESARR 5; 
 
The provider of air traffic services at its ATC unit(s) shall ensure that unit(s) have 
approved competence schemes to satisfy the requirement that controllers must 
maintain operational competence and experience. These procedures shall include 
requirements for controllers to: 
 
a) Complete a specified minimum number of controlling hours within a specified 
period on the sectors or operational positions for which they hold valid ratings; 
b) Be subject to an assessment of their continuing competence; 
c) Undertake periodical refresher and emergency training; 
d) Ensure operational competence after returning from extended periods of 
absence; (EUROCONTROL, 2002, p.13) 
 
These four procedures are created to ensure that operational competence and experience is 
maintained. It is however difficult to generalise and quantify experience as something that is 
retained in these terms. The quality of the four procedures can vary and ultimately depend upon 
the focus, emphasis and purposefulness of the training or assessment.  
 
Hutton & Klein (1999) presented a clear linkage between experience and the nature of expertise. 
They argued that developing expertise is experience dependent; “expertise is gained through 
participating in and experiencing many different situations” (p.35).  They furthermore claim that; 
 
Experience allows the expert to visualize how a course of events is likely to 
unfold, so that s/he can form expectancies from the beginning. Experience allows 
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one to notice when these expectancies are being violated, when something that 
was expected did not occur. Experience provides one with the ability to make 
finer perceptual discriminations, and to focus in on the relevant information while 
tuning out the noise, irrelevant, or unfruitful information and subsequent possible 
courses of action. (p.43) 
 
Expectancy or expectation is a factor that is particularly relevant as it is connected to mental 
readiness. According to Weick & Sutcliffe (2007), every deliberate action is based on assumptions 
about how the environment will react and these assumptions will ultimately guide our 
behavioural choices. Expectations will suggest the probable course of event through attention 
guidance. Within competence assessment the notion of expectation could take various forms 
dependent upon the contextual setting of the assessment itself. ATCO actions and choices in the 
setting of a dedicated check will most likely be affected by the fact that the ATCO is being 
monitored and the performance is being assessed as well as measured against a standardised 
performance criteria. This additional awareness based upon assumptions related to the conditions 
of the assessment will be less dominant in a continuous assessment setting.  
 
Another aspect examined by Hutton & Klein (1999) was the connection between skilled 
performance and the characteristics and development of expertise. They identified expert 
performance or expertise as;  
 Vast domain-specific knowledge  
 Understanding of large meaningful patterns and the ability of seeing “the invisible” 
 Efficient and consistent performance due to skill automaticity  
 Superior short-, long-term memory along with being attuned to the goal-relevant 
constraints in the environment  
 Problem-solving at a deeper contextual level 
 Strong self-monitoring skills  
 Refined perceptual abilities, seeing;  
o Typicality 
o Distinctions 
o Antecedents and consequences 
This development of expertise in a skill is contextualized by Hutton & Klein in the previously 
mentioned Rasmussen model. They maintain that “the acquisition of expertise can be described 
as a progression through these levels of conscious control with skill-based control characterizing 
the performance of an expert” (p.36).  
 
Monitoring this type of expert performance would almost be meaningless if the sole purpose was 
to assess rule and procedure compliance. Another purpose which can be served by this form of 
monitoring of expert performance, is the understanding of everyday performance through the 
experience and expertise of the ATCO. This is by far more valuable and will offer greater 
organisational insight. Competence can take many forms and it is by no means a static skill set 
which can easily be monitored and measured. As technology advances and human-system 
integration increases, the skill pattern and nature of work will change and lead to an alteration in 
the patterns of expertise. 
 
Ensuring a safe and efficient service provision is not based on compliance alone. The ability to 
anticipate and adapt is essential to ensure resilience within a socio-technical system like ATM. 
Branlat & Woods argue that “the resilience of a system corresponds to its adaptive capacity tuned 
to the future” (2010, p.30). It is therefore critical to include aspects like adaptive capacity in 
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competence assessment to foresee future challenges. Applying a Safety-II perspective could 
provide important information regarding performance variability, adaptation, performance 
adjustments and emergence. All of which are key elements in understanding normal work. 
(Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
2.2 Safety-I and Safety-II  
 
In “A Tale of Two Safeties” (Hollnagel, 2013a), the concept of two diverse safety management 
approaches, Safety-I and Safety-II, is introduced. Hollnagel argues that safety cannot be managed 
solely by applying a reactive approach, a mere response to failure. Today’s tightly coupled systems 
require an enhanced focus on proactively ensuring that things go right.  
 
Safety-I, according to Hollnagel, is epitomised by the traditional portrayal of safety as a state 
where the number of adverse outcomes is as low as possible. Attention is mainly placed on 
adverse outcomes and unacceptable risks that are assumed to have bimodal and identifiable 
causes. The human is predominantly viewed as fallible and liable. Hollnagel claims that;  
 
According to the logic of Safety-I, the goal - the coveted state of safety - can be 
achieved by constraining all kinds of performance variability. Examples of 
frequently used constraints are selection, strict training, barriers of various kinds, 
procedures, standardization, rules, and regulations (Hollnagel, 2013a, p.6) 
 
Acceptable outcomes and a low number of adverse events are, in Safety-I, seen as the product of 
procedure compliance. Success is attained by conforming to the detailed description of Work-As-
Imagined (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
Safety-II is defined as a condition where the number of successful outcomes is as high as 
possible. Focus is placed on ensuring things go right instead of preventing them from going 
wrong (Hollnagel, 2014). Outcomes are emergent rather than resultant and achieved through 
performance adjustments by the human operator. Performance variability is a key concept of 
system performance in Safety-II, and the human is recognized as an important asset to ensure 
system flexibility and resilience (Hollnagel, 2013a). Safety-II has its heart in the principle of 
equivalence i.e. success and failures as originate from the same set of actions taken within the 
system. Understanding emergent behaviours does not rely upon Work-As-Imagined i.e. 
procedures and rules, but on Work-As-Done.  
 
Exploring the gap between Work-As-Imagined and Work-As-Done is essential to comprehend 
the complexity of normal work. Dekker argues that “For progress on safety, organizations must 
monitor and understand the reasons behind the gap between procedures and practice. 
Additionally, organizations must develop ways that support people’s skill at judging when and 
how to adapt” (Dekker, 2003, p.235).  
 
Kontogiannis & Malakis (2012) state that “Practitioners consider adaptation and interpretation of 
procedures to be an integral part of their work” (p.8). They furthermore suggest that the 
professional norms of the practitioner: 
 
… tend to value judgment rather than compliance to rules, confidence in their 
abilities to solve problems and reliance on teamwork to promote safety. 
Adaptation of rules and procedures is also affected by the social context of work 
and professional cultures (p.8) 
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Competence assessment, whether it is done as a dedicated check or as continuous assessment, is 
meant to identify the potential gap between procedures and practice. Identifying, however, does 
not include gaining an understanding of the context of the gap and the goal conflicts which 
frequently lead to rule violation. (Weichbrodt, 2015). The mind-set by which the competence 
assessment is conducted, determines if understanding and learning from discretionary judgements 
and adaptations are seen as core elements.  
 
Adaptation and efficiency versus thoroughness aspects of individual judgment is described in 
Hollnagel’s ETTO principle (Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off). Hollnagel claims that 
“making such trade-offs is not only normal for humans and organisations, it is actually necessary” 
(Hollnagel, 2009, p.62). When people stop making trade-offs and work strictly according to all 
procedures, every rule and regulation, the organization will experience a loss of efficiency. “In 
extreme cases, ‘work-to-rule’ is referred to as malicious compliance” (Hollnagel, 2009, p.62). 
 
Efficiency is related to getting the work done, accomplishing a task and ensuring productivity. 
Time, money and effort are critical factors in determining the amount of resources required to 
get the work done. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the quality 
output of the work and making sure that the right things are getting done. “Moving toward 
Safety-II means moving toward effectiveness rather than simply away from failure. By 
understanding effectiveness more holistically and clearly, it is possible to derive benefits beyond 
safety “(Shorrock, 2013). The aim of competence assessment is to assure the quality output of the 
work as well as understanding effectiveness. But in order to comprehend effectiveness, light must 
be shed on the principle of approximate adjustments (Hollnagel, 2014). Daily constraints and the 
underspecification of normal work necessitates performance variability and creates a precondition 
for approximate adjustments.   
 
Rankin, Lundberg, Woltjer, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel (2013) point out that; “models and 
methods for systematically gathering knowledge regarding necessary adaptation are rarely seen in 
organizations today” (p.4). They claim an increased awareness of the adaptive strategies is 
necessary “to strengthen the organization’s abilities to anticipate and monitor change” (p.5). They 
furthermore point out that “knowledge about performance variability is not commonly 
recognized as an asset, and informal solutions to systemic problems often go unnoticed by 
organizations” (p.4). Hollnagel exemplifies the connection between event probability and ease of 
perception in a distribution curve that can be viewed below in Figure 1.  
 
                     
 
Figure 1. Relationship between event probability and ease of perception. Reprinted with 
permission (Hollnagel, 2015) 
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Traditionally the focus of competence assessment has been placed at the left tail of the 
distribution curve in Figure 1, where performance with a negative or non-standard outcome is 
commented upon and to a certain point also corrected. This embodies a Safety-I mind-set where 
procedural compliance takes precedence of appreciating the variability of normal work. A 
transition towards Safety-II within competence assessment would entail a shift in attention to 
also embrace the middle section of the distribution curve in Figure 1, as it represents the typical 
adjustments of performance needed to ensure effectiveness. Looking at performance as a whole, 
rather than solely searching for examples of non-compliance, will enhance the understanding of 
the everyday activities of normal work. Yet in order to be able to monitor the middle distribution, 
the ATCOs must feel confident and assured, that the management accept and support the 
intricate findings of normal work. Displaying Work-As-Done instead of a temporary version of 
Work-As-Imagined during a competence assessment, requires organisational willingness, 
openness and trust. Building organisational trust to ensure employee openness can be facilitated 
through a shift in focus, from exclusively monitoring and assessing the individual, to include a 
systems perspective.  
 
In August 2014, a White Paper was issued by EUROCONTROL with the purpose of moving 
towards Safety-II. The aim was to increase and promote systems thinking through ten key 
principles. Understanding the nature of the interactions between the elements of the socio-
technical system and the ten principles is seen as vital in terms of improving system performance. 
These principles can be divided further into four categories based on a system focus; 
 
 People as part of the system 
 System conditions 
 System dynamics 
 System outcomes 
When referring to system dynamics in this thesis, it incorporates the notion of interactions between 
people, equipment and procedures along with the flow of work through the system. An 
additional aspect is the trade-offs made, in order to resolve goal conflicts and balance efficiency 
with thoroughness. Lastly the principle of performance variability is included to understand the 
variability of system conditions, demands and behaviour (EUROCONTROL, 2014).    
 
The ten principles can be viewed below in Figure 2.      
                    
 
Figure 2. Ten principles of systems thinking. Reprinted with permission (Licu et al., 2013)     
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2.3 Why the need for a transition from Safety-I to Safety-II in competence assessment? 
 
Competence assessment as seen from a Safety-I perspective is concerned with standardisation of 
the individual against the described procedures of Work-As-Imagined. The main purpose is to 
ensure the performance of the ATCO will not impose an unacceptable risk or potential hazard. 
In EUROCONTROL’s Guidelines for Competence Assessment it is stated that; 
 
Competence assessment of controllers must be a genuine test of a controller’s 
operational skill and knowledge. Although failure during competence assessment 
is expected to be a rare occurrence, the actual assessment must be seen by 
controllers as one in which they will not automatically be assessed as competent in 
respect of their performance. (EUROCONTROL, 2005, p.8) 
 
This statement represents a view of work as it is described and proscribed in operations manuals, 
rules, procedures etc. It characterises Work-As-Imagined and is a static and formalised view or 
idea of what is expected in operational practices (Hollnagel, 2015). Placing focus on the 
individual in preference to understanding the systemic or procedural difficulties and daily trade-
offs is counterproductive, and will never help in understanding Work-As-Done. Real world 
operational practice will almost certainly differ from the perspective of Work-As-Imagined as it 
relate to the availability of resources, serviceability of technical systems and constraints embedded 
in the system. Work-As-Done reflects the daily practice in a constantly changing work 
environment that constitute the features of normal work. Understanding everyday activities and 
the reason for their successful outcome is an essential aspect of Safety-II.  
 
Safety-II as defined by Hollnagel (2014) focuses on performance variability and the principle of 
approximate adjustments which are common features of a complex socio-technical system such 
as Air Traffic Management (ATM). These features are ever present in the normal work of 
practitioners who frequently adjust their performance to match the conditions when time or 
resources are limited or underspecified. Since performance variability, performance adjustments 
and adaptation are typical structures of normal work, they are unquestionably worth exploring in 
order to gain a deeper awareness and understanding of how they manifests themselves in today’s 
operation. 
 
To date most of the literature concerning Safety-II is presented in the context of safety 
management. The Safety-II principles are however just as well-suited for competence assessment.  
Operationalising the Safety-II concept in the mandatory competence assessment scheme, would 
give accountable managers and the safety department access to a vast amount of information on 
how work is currently being carried out. Analysing data from incidents and accidents will 
undeniably still be of great importance to a safety department and exceedingly more useful, given 
this is consistent with the Safety-II philosophy. An example of this could be a combined parallel 
process of including competence assessors to monitor and gather information on how similar 
situations are being solved every day. With this kind of information, the organisation might begin 
to understand the context of the ATCOs performance adjustments. The ATCOs are daily using 
and navigating the system’s adaptive capacity to ensure that things go right, therefore they should 
be seen and recognised as a resource to ensure flexibility within the system. 
 
Hollnagel argues that performance variability is a strength rather than a liability, and that it is the 
humans’ ability to overcome problems, that is the reason why socio-technical organisations 
function well in terms of both safety and productivity. He reasons that; “Since human 
performance can both enhance and detract from system safety (and quality), assessment methods 
must be able to address this duality” (Hollnagel, 2012, p.25). This supports the demand of 
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expanding the current assessment method to include new skills and explore the dynamic patterns 
of expertise. The structure of what to look for is essential and should include aspects like 
adaptive strategies and performance variability. The prevailing approach in many countries is 
exclusively based upon Safety-I and requires a further development as it is reactive only. It is 
similarly important to understand that the suggested approach will be different from traditional 
observational techniques like; Normal Operation Safety Survey (NOSS) and Day to Day Safety 
Survey (D2D), as the philosophy will not be a framework of threat and error management as 
encompassed in the EUROCONTROL white paper of Observational Safety Surveys 
(EUROCONTROL, 2011). 
 
Observing normal work could be a wide-ranging and very costly approach, unless it is possible to 
utilise a method or platform which is already in place. The compulsory competence assessment 
of ATCOs could provide such a framework if appropriately adapted to the Safety-II philosophy. 
With the purpose of understanding necessary performance adjustments in an intractable system, 
with fluctuating production pressures, varying demands and frequent goal-conflicts, it is 
increasingly important to place focus on the system as a whole, and not solely on the 
performance of the individual practitioner acting within the system. Exploring how and why 
ATCOs adjust their performance is essential if an organisation is interested in, and attentive 
towards the complexity of normal work. An organisational benefit of increasing the attentiveness 
towards the intricacy of normal work or Work-As-Done, is the potential to sustain or even 
increase the effectiveness of the system as a whole. 
 
Developing a Competence Assessment Scheme that is able to both monitor successes and 
failures of normal work, in addition to the constantly changing delta between Wok-As-Imagined 
and Work-As-Done, would unquestionably improve the organisation’s ability to succeed under 
varying conditions. Broadening the target of competence assessment from individual depth to a 
systemic breadth could facilitate the transition from Safety-I towards a Safety-II perspective. 
Investigating how to respectfully combine Safety-I &-II thinking in assessment, could perchance 
assist in understanding the gap between procedures and practice. The competence assessment 
could represent a method or a model for systematically gathering knowledge regarding necessary 
adaptations and performance variability, as called upon by Dekker (2003) & Rankin et al. (2013). 
The findings may possibly help us comprehend how adaptation of rules and procedures is 
affected by the social context of work and professional cultures as suggested by Kontogiannis & 
Malakis (2012) and Weichbrodt (2015). 
 
Six important features of Safety-II were identified as a result of this literature review: 
 
 Why things go right 
 Work-As-Done  
 Approximate adjustments  
 Performance variability 
 People as a resource to ensure flexibility 
 Trade-offs 
 
In the following Result & Analysis section, the aim is to enhance understanding of these six 
features as viewed in the context of competence assessment of ATCOs.  
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3. METHOD 
 
3.1 Designing the research approach 
 
This qualitative study used the framework of Grounded theory to allow a consistent comparative 
analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) throughout the data collection process. The aim was to closely 
examine the current practice of the yearly competence assessment of Air Traffic Controllers, 
both as a concept and an operational process. According to Strauss & Corbin (1998), theory 
development and explaining practice is grounded in data from informants who have experienced 
the process themselves. 
 
The purpose of the research was to examine to what extent Safety-II is incorporated in today’s 
competence assessment through the specific perspective of performance variability and 
adaptation. Triangulation of data collected from three European ATC units, with different 
assessment approaches, methods and philosophies, provided a basis from which it was possible 
to explore the complexity of competence assessment and the research question of this thesis.    
 
3.2 ATC units and their assessment methodology  
 
The ATC units were carefully selected to represent three diverse approaches to competence 
assessment and to ensure breadth in the data. In addition to the imperative variance in 
assessment philosophy, the chosen units correspondingly represented three different types and 
sizes of organisations. An overview of the units and their characteristics are presented in Table 1.  
The units are: 
 Vienna Approach, part of Austro Control 
 Malmö ATCC, a NUAC upper area center in Sweden 
 Inverness Tower, part of the HIAL group in Scotland 
All three organisations are following and complying with the Competence Assessment Scheme 
recommendations issued by Eurocontrol.  
 
Table 1. Unit characteristics pertaining to competence assessment 
 
 
 Vienna Approach Malmö ATCC Inverness TWR 
Unit size Medium (50 ATCOs) Big (180 ATCOs) Small (13 ATCOs) 
Assessment 
methodology 
Continuous assessment  
(Was introduced February 
2014) 
Dedicated check A combination of dedicated 
check and continuous 
assessment 
Method 
enactment 
Unit assessors are working as 
ATCOs and are a normal part 
of the shift. There are no 
targeted days for observation, 
it is a holistic impression of 
the ATCO’s work. 
One yearly dedicated 
check (2 times 1 hour 
working in position 
covering the executive 
and planner position) 
One yearly dedicated check 
and a monthly check either 
monitoring in position or 
pulling a sample from R/T 
and radar readouts. 
Briefing No Yes Yes, preceding the dedicated 
check. 
Not in conjunction with the 
monthly sampling 
Debriefing No 
(Unless the assessor has 
observed something that 
needs to be discussed) 
Yes Yes, after the dedicated 
check. 
A written feedback form is 
generated after the monthly 
sampling. 
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3.3 Informants  
 
The informants of this study were at the time of the thesis research all directly or indirectly 
involved in the Competence Assessment Scheme and were thus selected to represent the 
following four categories from each of the three ATC units;  
 
 Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) 
 Competence Assessors 
 Management 
 Safety Manager(s)                                                     
The structure of using informants from these four diverse groupings was designed so in order to 
comprehend the concept of competence assessment as it is perceived by not only each individual 
but also the group as a whole. Group demography in terms of gender and experience can be 
viewed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Informant group demography on gender and experience 
 
 Total number Female Male Experience span within ATC 
ATCOs 9 2 7 From 4 – 25 years 
Assessors 4 1 3 From 22 – 20 years 
Managers 5 0 4 From 16 – 35 years 
Safety Managers 2 0 4 From 19 – 24 years 
 
3.4 Data collection 
 
16 semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to obtain qualitative data. The format of 
semi-structured interviews provided a framework that allowed an almost identical set of questions 
to all informants as well as enabling the coding process (Stake, 2010). The flexible structure and 
the use of open-ended questions, facilitated exploration in areas of particular interest for the 
interviewee(s). To obtain affirmation or exclusion of certain essential research topics, this 
researcher included a number of closed questions to ensure reliability of the data. All closed 
questions had follow up question to guarantee an elaborated or in depth answer. 
 
Four of the interviews were conducted as small focus group interviews, with two informants, to 
create a safe experience and accommodate individuals who could prefer to discuss issues within a 
group (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2010). In order to be able to determine how strongly my 
informants hold an opinion, meaning the relative emphasis on an issue, it was decided not to mix 
the four group categories. An additional reason was the importance of ensuring good group 
dynamics when discussing sensitive group specific matters. The 16 interviews were divided 
between the three units and the four group categories as indicated in table 3. In total this study 
included and interviewed 20 informants. 
 
Table 3. Interview overview 
 
Unit Competence 
Assessors 
ATCOs Management Safety  
Managers 
Malmö ATCC 1 (FG) 1 (FG) 2 (II) N/A² 
Vienna APP  1 (II) 2 (FG) 1 (II) 1 (II) 
Inverness TWR¹ 1 (II) 3 (II) 2 (II) 1 (II) 
 
II = Individual Interview, FG = Focus group, N/A = Not applicable. 
 
¹Note: In Inverness it was not possible to conduct focus group interviews due to staff shortage.  
²Note: In Malmö the function of the Safety Manager is fulfilled by the Manager Operations ATCC Malmö. 
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3.5 Interviews 
 
All interviews were conducted on site in each of the three countries between September 17th and 
November 12th 2014. Prior to commencing the interview the participants were informed of the 
aim and scope of the research project. The structure of the interview was explained and 
acceptance for voice recording was given. Their willingness to participate was confirmed and an 
informed consent form was signed. An example of the informed consent form can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
 
The duration of the interviews ranged between 1 to 1½ hours. All interviews were recorded by 
the use of a Dictaphone and later transcribed and categorised using an Excel spreadsheet for each 
of the informant categories.  Three of the four Swedish interviews were translated into English as 
a number of informants preferred to conduct the interview in their own mother tongue.     
 
A standardised interview guide (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015) was created to cater all four 
informant categories. The content of this uniform questionnaire covered;  
 
 The introduction of the research project 
 Informant background 
 Generic questions which were applicable for all informants 
 Closing remarks 
Unit and category specific questions were added to cover significant domain themes and 
perspectives. The interview guides were updated and revised in between field visits to avoid 
collecting useless data or to ensure the right questions were being asked. This is in line with 
Czarniawska (2014), and recommended practice for interviews based upon Grounded theory. 
All interview guides can be found in Appendix 2 – 12. 
 
Two pictures were included and used as part of the interview guide. The first picture titled “The 
boxes” was used to investigate the informant’s perception of the unit’s competence assessment 
approach or methodology. The data collected during this discussion is presented in depth in the 
result & analysis section (4.2 Competence assessment as of today). 
 
The second picture titled “The assessment environment” was meant to explore the perceived 
purpose of Competence Assessment and place it in context with different approaches to 
competence assessment. The data obtained during the discussions did not indicate any specific 
patterns or themes and consequently the question was not pursued any further. Both pictures can 
be found in Appendix 13 and 14. 
 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
 
The research of this study was facilitated by the management of all three units as they showed a 
real interest and provided access to staff and relevant documentation. Acceptance and approval 
were given to publish the findings in the format required by Lund’s University. 
 
Participation in the study was voluntarily and all interviews were performed during the 
informants working hours. The informants was informed of the purpose and nature of the 
interview as well as the contextual use of their involvement. It was explained that statements and 
quotes will be anonymized to ensure confidentiality. Within certain group categories, the sample 
size was too small to ensure anonymity, hence an agreement was made with the informant to 
review and approve the quote or statement. All informants were presented with and signed an 
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informed consent form adhering to the layout and guidelines issued by Lund’s University 
(Appendix 1). The investigator of this study co-signed the consent forms and a copy of each is 
stored with all the research data.   
 
3.7 Coding and data analysis  
 
The coding and analysis of data were influenced by Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The analysis process commenced with 
open coding of the data to find the main categories of information. The data was investigated 
thoroughly and codes representing various themes, were generated to catalogue the embedded 
messages in the data.  
 
The following phase consisted of axial coding where the concept and view of competence emerged 
as a core phenomenon in accordance with Creswell’s depiction (2007). During the axial coding, 
three main themes related to competence were identified as essential categories closely connected 
to the core phenomenon of competence. The three themes are; Competence - a versatile 
concept, Competence Assessment as of today and Competence Assessment in consonance with 
Safety-II. These themes are all related to, or affected by what Creswell (2007) describe as; 
 
 Causal conditions; what factors caused the core phenomenon 
 Strategies; actions taken in response to the core phenomenon 
 Contextual & Intervening conditions; broad and specific situational factors that influence the 
strategies 
 Consequences; outcome of strategies (p.64 & 65) 
The three competence themes are analysed and viewed through Safety-I and Safety-II strategies, 
conditions and consequences in the Result & Analysis section.  
 
The third and the last phase was the selection coding. This process consisted of verifying and 
identifying relationships and patterns across different subsets of data. The findings resulted in an 
enhanced competence model based on a synthesis of Safety-I and Safety-II principles. 
 
3.8 Validity 
 
The thesis research used a set of data collected from three ATC units, representing different 
ANSPs in three European countries. There are undeniably many more ATC units and ANSPs in 
Europe, which could add more detail and variety to the investigation of today’s competence 
assessment methods and approaches. However, in order to keep this research within the 
framework of a thesis, the number of units were deliberately set to three to cater for the three 
well-know and accepted assessment methods; 
 
 Dedicated check 
 Continuous assessment 
 A combination of dedicated check and continuous assessment 
The ANSPs and units were cautiously selected to represent a reliable cross section of ANSPs in 
Europe. 
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4. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
Inspired by Grounded Theory and the use of Open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and Axial 
coding (Creswell, 2007), three main themes were identified as relevant for the exploration of the 
thesis question: 
 
 Competence - a versatile concept 
 Competence Assessment as of today 
 Competence and competence assessment in consonance with Safety-II  
 
The properties and dimensions of these three themes were closely examined by the use of 
exploratory questions, some of which were derived from the interview guide, others emerged 
during the open coding process of the 16 transcripts. The conception of the themes emerged 
from the statements of the 20 participants. Each of these themes will be explored and analysed in 
depth. 
 
4.1 Competence - a versatile concept 
 
In order to comprehend competence both as a concept and as something which can be 
measured, the word in itself had to be defined by the informants. It was critical to understand 
competence as seen through their lens of interpretation. The intention was to investigate if there 
would be a clear and common view of competence, and to examine if essential elements are 
absent in the existing definition of competence.  
 
All informants were asked to define or describe competence, along with the means of 
measurement. The statements were sorted according to group category before being coded and 
analysed. During the coding process, the informants’ view of competence was examined and 
initially categorised according to the traditional ESARR 5 (2002) classification of Skill, 
Knowledge and Experience.  
 
Figure 3. Competence model according to ESARR 5 
 
 
 
These three elements of competence were given a colour code to facilitate the coding and 
analysis process. Statements covering Skill-based competence were underlined in yellow, 
Knowledge-based in green and Experience-based in blue. Despite an emerging pattern among the 
statements, numerous descriptions and definitions of competence were still not compatible with 
any of the above.  
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The next and the fourth element of competence to be recognised, was the need for Social 
competence. The associated comments advocating social skills and team work, were given the 
colour red.  
 
A theme that emerged from the informants’ statements, was the significance of flexibility and the 
ability to adapt. This theme included workarounds and adapting to unusual circumstances. 
Though these might feature in the experience and skill element of the competence model, the 
weight the informants gave to these aspects, justified consideration of a separate category of its 
own. For that reason it was decided to include a fifth competence element, namely Adaptive 
competence. 
 
There still remained a body of informant responses which could not be categorised. Many of the 
statements were found to be linked to the features of the operational environment, e.g. the 
requirement of providing a high level of service, supporting flight efficiency or being able to 
work at a ‘normal’ speed. A sixth element labelled Service-driven competence was therfore created 
to accommodate the emphasis placed on service and efficiency as being an important part of 
ATCO competence. 
 
The data analysis resulted in an expanded competence model with six elements. Three new 
elements emerged from the statements of the informants. The six stage competence model 
represents a synthesis of the ESARR 5 definition of competence and the data provided by the 
informants. The new model was adapted to also include a view where Work-As-Imagined and 
Work-As-Done has relevance.  
 
Figure 4. The six stage competence model 
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Coding the data according to the six stage model revealed a far more complicated picture of what 
competence involves than the traditional approach to competence. The colour coded data used 
to define the six stage competence model can be found in appendix 15 “Competence – coding of 
data”. 
 
4.1.1 Skill-based competence 
 
The ATCOs’ depiction of skill-based competence is mainly concerned with the aptitude of doing 
the craft you have been trained and tasked to do. It is the hands-on aspect of operational work. 
One of the ATCO informants noted that the individual ATCO bears responsibility to “ensure 
that you are equipped to do so” (Informant 4, ATCO). An interesting remark made by another 
informant was that one “should obey the rules where it is necessary and know when to break a 
rule” (Informant 1, ATCO). The skill-based competence in this example is not the knowledge 
part of the rule, but the enactment of complying and deviating when needed. In the current 
competence assessment scheme the Skill-based competence is being measured according to 
compliance. However the statement provided by the ATCO informant disclose that compliance 
is only seen as one part of Skill-based competence.  
 
When analysing the statements from the assessor informants the notion of skill was only 
described in very general terms such as “the ability to do the work in a safe and in a good way” 
(Informant 7, Assessor), or “the ability to undertake one’s chosen role to an acceptable standard” 
(Informant 9, Assessor).  
 
The management informants referred to skill-based competence as the ability to perform a 
function. This was exemplified as working with the procedures and converting theory into 
practice. A manager added a thought-provoking statement regarding his role in assuring a suitable 
environment;  
 
That I as a manager has created an environment where I have ensured that his 
workspace and the development I have given him, the people he works with, the 
equipment he uses all comes together where he can apply his skills (Informant 13, 
Management).  
 
Seen from a two dimensional angle the skill-based competence is not only personified in the 
ATCO, the management play an important role in facilitating the enactment of the ATCOs’ 
skills.  
 
The statements of the safety managers which related to skill were a mixture of tangible examples 
like; phraseology, application of procedures and management of de-conflicting minima. As well 
as a generalised view of “acting and delivering in exactly the same way as you've been trained to 
do” (Informant 16, Safety Manager). This viewpoint may well signpost a Safety-I aka Work-As-
Imagined interpretation of required ATCO competence. 
 
4.1.2 Knowledge-based competence 
 
When describing competence, many of the ATCOs associate it with theoretical knowledge and 
the regulatory requirements. Knowing, as well as complying with the rules and procedures is seen 
as a way of ensuring standardisation. Knowledge is similarly referred to as “knowing where the 
boundaries lie – pushing to the boundaries, but never exceeding them” (Informant 6, ATCO). An 
aspect which was linked to the knowledge-based competence, was the requirement of ensuring 
that one is up-to-date with any changes going on.  
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The numerous changes within the governing framework was mentioned by the assessors as an 
add-on to the complexity of the operational environment. They recognise theoretical knowledge 
as being an essential part of competence, still it was also stated that “it is not just the new rules 
you need to keep up with” (Informant 8, Assessor). Knowing the rules is not sufficient, the 
application of the rules is essential for competence. This statement is further elaborated in the 
section describing Adaptive competence.  
 
The Management concur in terms of knowing and working in accordance with the requirements 
of the legislation. They correspondingly lay emphasis on the necessity of being “well-prepared 
and well-read within the required subject matters” (Informant 12, Management).  
 
One of the statements given by a safety manager could be associated with knowledge-based 
competence, as this pertain to the correctness of performing the previously described examples 
of skill-based competence; “Correct R/T phraseology, correct application of procedures” 
(Informant 16, Safety Manager). 
 
4.1.3 Experience-based competence 
 
Competence was labelled by one ATCO as “the ability to use previous experience to safely 
manage any given situation to the best possible outcome for that situation” (Informant 6, 
ATCO). Another informant stated that “you must have enough experience” (Informant 2, 
ATCO). This statement is fascinating, as it can be seen as supporting the previous quote by 
stressing the significance of using experience to safely navigate the operational environment. The 
same ATCO revealed that “The first year is very hard. You are often afraid since you do not 
know how to manage difficult traffic situations. You don't have the experience and you don't 
really know how it works” (Informant 2, ATCO).   
 
The assessors recognise the impact of experience and relates this with working part-time, along 
with the importance of feeling “comfortable and confident while working” (Informant 8, 
Assessor).  
 
One of the management informants talks about the “background to interpret” information laid 
out in procedures (Informant 14, Management). Having a background to interpret can only come 
from experience and thereby confirm the relevance. It furthermore point towards 
underspecification of procedures, which is a core characteristic of complex systems. This 
comment combined with the ATCO statements provide insight into the way that knowledge and 
experience is treated in the competence assessment scheme and there is evidence that it goes 
beyond a compliance based system. 
 
A safety manager described competence as; “you will get more competent with more routine, 
with more experience. Competence is an ongoing process it never stops” (Informant 15, Safety 
Manager). 
 
4.1.4 Social competence  
 
Social competence stands out from the original ESARR 5 derived competence elements, as 
something needed to be added to categorise the informants’ responses. 
 
When defining competence, an insinuation of social aptitude materialised in all informant groups. 
Cooperation, teamwork, helpfulness and social skills were mentioned by the ATCO informants. 
  
25 
“It is also about cooperation and teamwork, that you help each other” (Informant 3, ATCO). 
“You need to get on with people you work with” (Informant 5, ATCO). 
 
Personality, rapport and fitting into the team were added by the assessors. “You have to fit in 
socially and be able to adapt since you work with many different colleagues” (Informant 8, 
Assessor).  
 
Management equally saw the social part and team interaction as being important. A manager 
characterised the cooperation between the ATCOs and the management as being a core 
competence; “being able to interact with the management of the unit and feel open and honest in 
relation to incident and accident investigation” (Informant 14, Management). 
  
4.1.5 Adaptive competence 
 
This competence element was added on account of the informants’ emphasis on the capabilities 
of flexibility and adapting to workarounds or unusual circumstances. The addition of this 
category was supported not only by the statements unfolding competence, it was reinforced by 
data pertaining to the operational environment and questions connected to performance 
adjustments and adaptations. Adaptive competence is particularly interesting as it is currently not 
present in any of the reviewed competence assessment schemes. Consequently the element of 
Adaptive competence will be explored more in depth and quotes belonging to the operational 
environment will be included to illustrate the influence the operational environment has upon 
competence.   
 
Flexibility and the ability to adapt were described by the ATCO informants as core competencies. 
This was expressed both in regard to the regulatory framework and the quickly changing 
circumstances of ATC, such as an unusual situation or an emergency. Rule compliance was by an 
ATCO contrasted with rule breaking or rule adaptation to gain potential safety benefits; “you 
should know when to break a rule. Don't misunderstand me but you should know when you 
have to do something to adapt the rules if there is a benefit for safety” (Informant 1, ATCO). 
Safety is seen as the hard target, adapting the rules to ensure safety appears to belong to the 
ATCO’s discretionary space.  
 
The Assessor informants added the perspective of adaptability in terms of working with different 
colleagues and unofficial workarounds or best practices; “it is not just the new rules you need to 
keep up with, there can also be workarounds and best practices to make it smoother and this 
might not be written down anywhere” (Informant 8, Assessor).  
 
The statements provided by management are very much aligned with the ATCOs. Flexibility, the 
ability to adapt and dealing with unusual circumstances were correspondingly defined as core 
competencies required when handling traffic. 
 
There is an importance of this element that brings new understanding to what competence means 
and entails. What follows is a more in depth discussion to clarify the relationship to the 
operational environment.  
 
When exploring the operational environment the ATCOs work in, there were several aspects 
which came into play. One of these was the perception of the operational environment in terms 
of stability and improvisation. All ATCOs described the environment as being stable and mostly 
routine except during special weather phenomenon like thunderstorms or for the period of busy 
summer traffic. One of the ATCOs described it in the following way; “It seems like it is a little of 
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both (stable and need for improvisation). You build everything upon experience and routine, still 
you need to adapt your decisions” (Informant 3, ATCO).  
 
Two assessors defined the operational environment as: “Challenging at times but mostly routine. 
The challenges are similar and quite repetitive. People are seeing these situations regularly, they 
can be momentarily challenging, but they are fairly predictable and with experience quite 
manageable” (Informant 9, Assessor).  
 
“Mostly routine, however the traffic situations vary everyday so you may need to come up with 
different solutions” (Informant 8, Assessor). 
 
Seen from a management perspective the environment can to some degree be defined as stable, 
however the need for flexibility can create situations of instability; 
 
It's pretty stable. Air traffic control always demands a certain degree of flexibility 
and unforeseen situations, but for the most times it's fairly stable. You can say we are 
in a stable condition of instability. With that I mean that we now have free route 
airspace. We drive traffic direct exit points from the area of responsibility (or 
neighbours area of responsibility) and we have these different agreements how we 
handle this traffic. So we have during the last five years created traffic patterns so 
they are not flying airways anymore, they are flying direct everywhere. So we have 
created an unstable traffic picture and that is ordinary work for us - that is an 
ordinary day. It is a new way of working, you almost work in the upper sector as 
you do in the lower sector, even in the TMAs. You are working more actively 
with the traffic” (Informant 11, Management, emphasis added). 
 
In Inverness the nearby location of one of the main UK RAF airbases (Lossiemouth) is described 
by management as an additional operational challenge;  
 
We have a very busy military airfield adjacent to us here, there's a lot of activity 
and very fast moving aircraft, and in fact our own radar can't even cope with it 
sometimes. So controllers do have to stay sharp (Informant 14, Management). 
 
Additional aspects which are central in understanding the operational environment, and the 
notion of normal work, is the frequency of performance adjustments and adaptations. The 
ATCO group were in agreement that adjustments and adaptations occur regularly; “Daily I would 
say. On every shift you have an element of that” (Informant 4, ATCO).  
 
“We do adjustments every day. It can be small changes which are used to get the traffic more 
expeditiously and fluently, so these are adjustments and we only do them when we have time to 
do them” (Informant 1, ATCO). 
 
“Daily, - it is rather complex. It seems like it is very often, especially due to the military activity” 
(Informant 3, ATCO) 
 
The group of assessors agree that adjustments and adaptations take place every day;  
 
You adapt every day and every situation is unique in some way. They are of course 
similar otherwise you could not handle them, but I would say that you need to 
adjust on a daily basis, there is always something that is a little bit different 
(Informant 7, Assessor). 
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In addition to this confirmation the assessor informants add the perspective of flexibility both 
within and outside the procedural framework during a competence assessment; 
 
I think it is still quite efficient and flexible despite following the rules. However if 
you are being assessed, and you need to do some adjustments which are outside 
the procedures, then they would comment and explain why they have chosen to 
do so. I generally think it works really well, and it is seldom we need to bypass the 
rules. Yet we do see different solutions and variations (Informant 8, Assessor). 
 
Management consistently confirmed the frequency of performance adjustments and adaptations. 
An interesting holistic perspective was added as several of the managers showed acceptance and 
understanding of; 
 Adaptations which at times disregard procedures, if safety is ensured 
 System adaptations 
 Adaptability as the core of the ATC profession 
It happens on a daily basis. Some procedures are quite strict, they have to be. You 
have to know what you are allowed /not allowed to do. I think adaptations are 
part of a common way to work and no one would criticise that, not even the 
assessor would blame the colleague, since you know it is a common way, you 
know it is against procedures, but it is safe (Informant 10, Management). 
 
I think it happens daily. It's both the traffic situations and then again if you adapt 
one day to a certain thing, then it's added to your experience-bank and then you 
know how to handle the situation. Maybe there are not new events every day, but 
they have to judge things from a non-structural traffic pattern. But what they have 
to adapt to in an even greater extend is how the system is running. They have to 
adapt towards which functions you have in the system and which functions aren't 
working, or how it was supposed to work. We call that workarounds and we have 
quite a few of those (Informant 11, Management). 
 
“It’s part of normal work to adapt to the current situation! You of course have a regulatory 
platform which both can serve as support and hindrance. Adaptability is the profession of air 
traffic control. You do this daily” (Informant 12, Management). 
 
The last aspect which is essential when exploring the operational environment is the ability to 
anticipate or foresee situations which will demand some kind of adjustment, customisation or 
adaptation. The ATCO informants mention experience as a key element in developing a bag or a 
kit of tools to cope with the needed adjustments and adaptations:  
 
With experience you get to know what options that are available to you. Maybe 
you don't know what option you are going to use until the last minute, but with 
experience you'll have a bag of tools. The need for adjusting the performance is 
usually due to expedition, of course within the realms of safety (Informant 4, 
ATCO).  
 
There are no answers. As long as you have the complete kit of tools, then you can 
adapt to every situation. But there are no, or very few definitive answers in air 
traffic. That is always one of the issues with trainees. You get trainees who are 
able to adapt and you get trainees that want the solution. The ones that want a 
solution are never going to make it as controllers, because there is not a solution. 
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You can't write down what to do in that situation because that situation, with 
those exact timings is never ever going to happen again and the answer is different 
if anyone factor changes at all (Informant 6, ATCO). 
 
An assessor adds that: “Sometimes they are very predictable and sometimes you cannot prepare 
like emergency situations or various weather situations” (Informant 7, Assessor). 
 
Management concur regarding the relationship between predictability and experience and refers 
to it as being proportional; “The longer you work with it, the more predictable it gets. You tend 
to know what the routes are for the fast jets etc. They are not written anywhere, but experience 
tells you” (Informant 13, Management). 
 
One of the management informants adds an interesting perspective regarding the ATCOs 
necessity for adjusting or adapting to a specific situation, and the drawback this may hold;  
“The systematic ones you can prepare for by learning new methods and so on. But the amount of 
workarounds is keeping back a capacity increase I would think. It is manageable, but there are 
quite a few” (Informant 11, Management). 
 
It was essential to triangulate the data regarding the operational environment as the informant 
groups view it from different angles and with dissimilar goals to be achieved. The data did 
however display a shared understanding of the current challenges entrenched in the operational 
environment. All informants describe the environment as being stable and mainly routine, though 
a need for improvisation is emphasised as the everyday variation demands a difference in 
solutions. Experience and routine facilitates the predictability, the adaptation and handling of 
challenging events. A management informant exemplifies an operational challenge with fast 
moving aircraft, as something the radar can’t cope with – so the ATCO has to stay sharp. Coping 
with this kind of complexity requires adaptation and flexibility. The effects and consequences of 
flexibility was mentioned by another manager as a potential source for creating not only 
instability, but a “stable condition of instability” (Informant 11, Management). Having an 
unstable traffic picture was described as ordinary work, on an ordinary day and accentuates the 
need for performance adjustments and adaptations.  
 
All informant categories confirmed adjustments and adaptations as a daily and vital part of 
operational work. If adjustments and adaptations are considered an accepted practice, then a 
fundamental query would be to explore whether we presently accommodate this in the 
competence assessment scheme. The quest will most likely end up empty-handed as the 
traditional competence assessment scheme is created from a safety-I perspective of compliance 
and procedural adherence. According to Hollnagel, Safety-I regards the role of performance 
variability to be harmful and should be prevented as far as possible. Safety-II on the other hand 
sees it as inevitable but also useful, it is something which should be monitored and managed 
(2014). The only way to monitor and understand adjustments and adaptations is if they can be 
seen as required constituents in a model used to encompass competence. In the six stage 
competence model this capability was included and labelled: Adaptive competence. 
 
4.1.6 Service-driven competence 
 
Service-driven competence was added due to the informants’ weight on capabilities additional to 
the aspect of working safely. Being service oriented and delivering a high level of service 
appeared to be the driver for working efficient and expeditiously. As with Adaptive competence, 
the Service-driven competence element was correspondingly supported by data extracted from 
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statements belonging to inquiries on operational trade-offs. Quotes are added from this area to 
ensure a thorough data analysis of this new element of competence.  
 
“Competence is not only to work safe, though safe is very important in our job. For competence 
it is also necessary to work in a normal speed” (Informant 2, ATCO). This statement was 
expressed by an ATCO and it specifies, that working safe is only one element of ATCO 
competency.  
 
An assessor informant raised the same issue and added the dimension of working too fast and 
expeditiously or too slow:  
 
On one side I have the impression that competence in our unit is to work fast and 
expeditiously. But that doesn't necessarily mean that you are competent. Because 
if it's fast and expeditious it's possible that it's not safe. On the other side if 
someone is working according to the book, according to the rules but not fast 
enough, then he's incompetent because he's slowing down the whole process” 
(Informant 7, Assessor).  
 
This of course characterise the outer parameters of acceptable performance, nevertheless it 
supports a statement made by another assessor that there are best practices for making things 
smoother.  
 
Service related competence was by management termed as a “common way to work” (Informant 
10, Management), “service that has a continuous high standard rather than peaks” (Informant 13, 
Management) and a consistent “level of service provision” (Informant 14, Management). 
 
An important aspect associated with Work-As-Done is the trade-off between efficiency and 
thoroughness. Hollnagel argues that “for a recurrent work situation most people will naturally 
choose the more efficient mode of operation as long as it, in their experience, is just as safe as the 
alternative” (2009, p.15). The question is whether this is perceived by the informants to be true or 
not. If it is so, then to what extent would the ATCOs use a trade-off during a competence 
assessment? 
 
The following quotes from the informants are their words and views on the operational reality of 
working with trade-off whilst sustaining service delivery: 
 
I would rate myself more at the efficient way, safe but rather efficient than to 
obey every rule till the end. If you turn an aircraft 5 nm before your sector 
boundary, where you know 99%, I can turn this aircraft without release from my 
colleague, then I will do it because it is a shortcut, it's more efficient and we are 
service orientated here. If we are not obeying to the rules exactly, then it is just to 
get it more efficient, nothing else. Whether I would do the same during an 
assessment, it would depend on who is sitting beside me (Informant 1, ATCO). 
 
“When we have a bad weather situation we are not efficient, we try to work safe” (Informant 2, 
ATCO). 
 
One situation which I think is quite typical, and I think most do this - is when an 
aircraft checks in on your frequency and it has not crossed the boundary yet, but 
you turn it directly so you don't have to get back to it later. You save a lot of time 
  
30 
and it prevents you from forgetting it. It varies whether you would do this during 
an assessment, it depends (Informant 3, ATCO). 
 
That is the point of the hotspot (feeder/director position) which came from the 
management. I think it is very often that people tend to make the most efficient 
spacing and the line-ups are not so good anymore. I often observe in bad weather 
situations like tricky wind situations and during lots of rain and so on, that only to 
fulfil the minimum distance, they turn them in much too early and much too high 
and much too fast. That is the problem we have identified. We are drilled to 
handle as much traffic as possible but there are times where it is better to be more 
thorough (Informant 7, Assessor). 
 
It doesn’t happen too often, but where you might see it is on radar if you have a 
sequence of inbound traffic where they can overload the R/T and add 
instructions to be efficient. The pilots might not pick up everything, so you have 
lost the efficiency (Informant 9, Assessor). 
 
Going from low to high traffic flow, can make the assesse forget that we are there. 
It is noticeable that they increase their pace and that is of course very positive. 
That is probably the best example of going from thorough to efficient. Certain 
weather situations like thunderstorms and CBs will make everything much more 
difficult. It is however stated that we shall conduct the assessment during normal 
traffic, so we can stop and cancel the assessment if we deem it to be outside the 
parameters of what constitutes as normal traffic (Informant 8, Assessor). 
 
On the subject of actually making a trade-off whilst undertaking an operational competence 
assessment, the informants said; 
 
“They would have to do some adaptions. But they would not break/bend procedures or rules on 
a dedicated check” (Informant 7, Assessor). 
 
Mostly yes actually, and this is where I like to think the sampling we have got is 
contributing to this. People are very aware that if they are not consistent in their 
actions and correct, then this will be picked up (Informant 9, Assessor). 
 
When we are talking about balancing safety with expedition, at the end of the day 
we are running a business. So every aircraft on the ground and off the ground on 
schedule and on time paints a good image of the airport, therefore it enhances the 
business opportunities. But I do not think procedures are stretched to allow this 
to happen. Because it’s a unique environment, everyone is a civil servant. All 
airports are subsidised as part of the socio development of the community. The 
controllers are not as worried if for safety reasons somebody goes into the hold 
and does four rounds in the hold. The airports will never close and nobody will 
ever be made redundant (Informant 13, Management).  
 
As a manager of the unit I need to have an efficient service provision. Sometimes 
you'll have very efficient controllers but you have to be careful from efficiency to 
being slick. All controllers get by sometimes on slickness, they have the old fox 
angle and they can work a procedure to make it fit. However the risk is that the 
Swiss cheese holes lines up somewhere else down the road and the slickness bites 
you on the butt (Informant 14, Management). 
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I think so, they have very high standards. Those trade-offs and workarounds they 
do, I don't think any of those are consciously or deliberately outside the 
requirements of what they should be. However I'm sure (like everywhere) that 
there are some amount of normalised risk, whereby normalised deviance where 
they don't even know they are doing little things. I don't think they would do it 
any differently under a dedicated assessment than under continuous assessment, 
except that they are completely switched on, because they are being scrutinised –
“I'm going back to the books. I'm going to do absolutely everything rigidly here 
by the books”. (Pause…..) I'm thinking as I'm talking to you. I would say that the 
ongoing assessment has the ability to pick up normalised deviance and normalised 
risk a lot better than the single one (Informant 13, Management). 
 
There are differences. At a dedicated check they will not do that, just because I get 
checked and I don’t do it (the aircraft will have to fly some miles more, to follow 
procedures) I will not be as flexible as I could be. Today they work normally when 
working with the competence assessor. The assessor will see and accept these 
adjustments and adaptation until a certain line and if something crosses that line 
he would feedback them and be active (Informant 10, Management). 
 
Adjusting work according to existing conditions was well recognised by all informants. 
Interestingly enough very few perceived this adjustment as being an efficiency/thoroughness 
trade-off. Adjusting their performance to match time constraints or limited resources was 
something they did without referring it to a loss of thoroughness. The data collected from the 
ATCO informants show that they distinguish themselves as being efficient and service-oriented. 
Efficiency is perceived as being more important than strict rule compliance. This clearly supports 
Hollnagel’s argument that people will choose the more efficient mode of operation, as long as it 
is perceived to be safe. An ATCO informant stated that during “a bad weather situation we are 
not efficient, we try to work safe” (Informant 2, ATCO). The remark is fascinating as it could 
indicate a strong day-to-day attention towards efficiency and on a day of challenging weather, the 
focus shifts to thoroughness. A thought-provoking question is then whether they perceive 
normal work as being so efficient that they consequently need to ‘borrow’ from safety on a daily 
basis?  
 
An assessor informant did point out that controllers are; “drilled to handle as much traffic as 
possible but there are times where it is better to be more thorough” (Informant 7, Assessor).  
An efficiency/thoroughness trade-off is closely linked to time and traffic amount or traffic flow. 
Another assessor refers to this kind of trade-off as being visible during a change in working pace.  
 
A management informant introduced the perspective of efficient service provision and a 
potential further development of efficiency into slickness. Working a procedure to make it fit 
could been seen as balancing safety with expedition. This is similarly described by management as 
the terms of running a business, since on-time-performance enhances the business opportunities.  
 
When probing if the ATCOs would make trade-offs during a competence assessment, the 
reaction from the ATCO informants was that it would depend upon the assessor. The assessor 
and management informants view it to be feasible up to a certain degree however emphasises 
that explicit rule breaking will most likely not occur.  
 
In reviewing the data it is apparent that efficiency/thoroughness trade-offs are a normal part of 
the ATCOs work. Trading thoroughness with efficiency is seen as a way of ensuring a high level 
of service. The ATCOs are willing to work around certain rules to obtain efficiency, save time 
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and prevent them from forgetting an aircraft. These actions seems to be driven by an aspiration 
of providing an excellent service. The statements provided by all informants recognise trade-offs 
as being part of normal and common practice and should therefore be included in the 
competence assessment. Understanding the interphase between the ATCO and the intricate 
features of a highly dynamic work environment is in line with Rasmussen argument that; 
 
The efficiency of humans in coping with complexity is largely due to the 
availability of a large repertoire of different mental representations of the 
environment from which rules to control behavior can be generated ad hoc. An 
analysis of the form of these mental models is important to the study of human 
interaction with complex man-made systems. (Rasmussen, 1983, p.258).  
 
For these reasons a sixth competence element was added to the competence model to cover the 
efficiency/thoroughness trade-offs: Service-driven competence.  
 
4.1.7 Perception of measurement  
 
Describing and defining competence is not straightforward and many of the informants found it 
to be both difficult and problematic. Still the process of unfolding competency seemed simple 
compared to the herculean task of specifying how it should be measured. Many of the ATCOs 
were unsure and referred to the means of measurement as a ‘feeling’, ‘work knowledge’ and 
‘experience’;  
 
“By a feeling. By your knowledge of how you would work and maybe to compare it to others and 
how they work. I don't know how to explain it” (Informant 1, ATCO) 
 
“Good question! Someone who is very experienced and who knows the game. We do need to be 
checked out, but how we should be checked out - I don't know” (Informant 5, ATCO) 
 
“It's not an empirical measurement. I don't know how you measure competency, but I know 
what it looks like when I see it and I know what it looks like when I don't see it” (Informant 6, 
ATCO) 
 
One ATCO suggested bringing in someone from the outside could be useful.  As a contrast, 
there was similarly a recommendation of keeping the current structure, as it was seen to “pick up 
recurring events or tendencies” (Informant 3, ATCO).   
 
It was not merely the ATCOs who seemed split in their interpretation. The assessor informants 
appeared to be equally divided, since some were lagging a clear definition; 
 
“We do not have a definition of it, so how can we measure it! It is a feeling whether it is good or 
bad” (Informant 7, Assessor). 
 
It almost comes to subjectiveness doesn't it, there is no figure obviously, one 
cannot state this in a book really or manual, it almost comes down to a gut feeling. 
It is related to one's own experience. What you would do is measured against your 
experience and you measured against your own perception of what is an 
acceptable level of demonstrated ability. If you know how you would handle the 
situation, and at the same time relate it to the individual who may not be as 
experienced as you. But as long as it's still safe, and that is really what you're 
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looking for. But there comes a point where it's an overall perception of the picture 
they portray (Informant 9, Assessor). 
These statements were contrasted by an assessor informant with an explicit example of using 
predetermined objectives extracted from the unit training plan;  
 
We measure against the described training objectives for first validation of 
students. They are described in the Unit Training Plan. We have taken the main 
objectives and boiled it down to accommodate licensed controllers, but it is 
almost the same (Informant 8, Assessor).  
 
The divergence between the two types of accounts authenticate the perceived difficulty 
of quantifying competence.  
 
This discrepancy was furthermore illustrated by the descriptions made by both management and 
the safety managers; 
 
That’s not easy! You can check that the colleague is doing sufficient spacing at the 
final and that each departure gets his requested flight level, these are hard facts! 
But the sense of competence is that you have to work like the whole community 
works that you fit together. That you’re one brick in the house (Informant 10, 
Management). 
 
That is a really tricky part. In a reactive way we can measure it by the reporting of 
occurrences and so on. But in a proactive way it is really hard to measure. You can 
measure it by looking at the amount of traffic handled without occurrences. 
Efficiency is absolutely one part of the competencies (Informant 11, 
Management). 
 
“Through how this is done today, theoretical and practical assessment” (Informant 12, 
Management). 
 
In my point of view, you cannot measure competence. Competence is always a 
judgement and there is someone who is judging if you are competent or not. The 
best judge to do it, is an open self-assessment. As an ATCO you should be honest 
enough to yourself and your colleagues if you are competent enough to work 
(Informant 15, Safety Manager). 
 
I would tend to go down the R/T sampling route or form. So how do we capture 
the errors, lapses whatever you want to call them? I would see a column by rule, 
those rules dictating exactly what you are looking for, where there has been some 
sort of error, lapse, slip - then you've got a scoring system alongside of that which 
gives you some sort of opportunity for trend analysis. Whether it is just a simple, 
(- 1, 0 & + 1 or poor practice, standard practice & very good practice) then that is 
the sort of stuff that could be captured. And with the right sort of software you 
can do a trend analysis for the whole company where you can see a particular area 
where there are a trend or weakness and then we can do something about it 
(Informant 16, Safety Manager). 
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Once again the span between the statements is striking. Measuring competence was described as 
not easy, tricky and even to the point that it could not be done. While another informant felt it 
should continue as presently with the use of theoretical and practical assessment. It was argued 
that there are some hard facts which can be measured, however it was also highlighted that there 
is a holistic and social perspective of working like the whole community which should be 
considered. The question is whether this kind of holistic and societal approach would be able to 
accommodate an open self-assessment as suggested by one of the informants. The idea of an 
open self-assessment is a vast contrast to the proposed sampling of and trend analysis of errors 
and lapses. Counting errors represent a reductionist approach of simplifying the ATCOs work 
into something which can be easily quantified and understood. This is a classic Safety-I path with 
a reactive response and a focus on restraining performance variability. Even though a proactive 
approach is argued as being hard to measure, the outcome of placing attention on traffic handled 
without occurrences will undeniably result in a better understanding of Work-As-Done. 
Comprehending Work-As-Done will most likely uncover and explain not only why efficiency is 
an important aspect of competence. It will similarly clarify the amounts of trade-offs and facilitate 
anticipation of potential events or occurrences.  
 
 
4.1.8 Reflections on competence as a versatile concept 
 
In this section the ESARR 5 competence requirements were explored through interview data. A 
number of shortcomings were identified and three new competence elements were introduced. 
The emergence of Social, Adaptive and Service-driven competence resulted in a six stage competence 
model that better suits the operational communities’ view of what competence means to them. 
The model epitomises a synthesis of elements associated with the features of Work-As-Imagined 
as well as Work-As-Done.  
 
In the current Competence Assessment Scheme, emphasis is placed on Work-As-Imagined and 
the means of measurement are limited to Skill-based competence during the practical part of the 
assessment, and Knowledge-based competence commonly assessed through theoretical examination 
in conjunction with the assessment. Both skills are measured against some nominal standard of 
Work-As-Imagined and hence justifies the location, the visualisation and the linkage of these 
three aspects in the model. 
 
While exploring the concept of operational competence in terms of requisite skills representing 
Work-As-Done, it became apparent that working as an ATCO involves different skills than what 
has previously been imagined. Adaptive and Service-driven competence were identified as essential 
Work-As-Done aptitudes and was therefore located next to each other in the competence model. 
The introduction of new competencies accentuates, that the competence assessment scheme 
needs versatility to be able to cope with complexity and the changes in the operational skill set.  
 
Today our view of competence must be adjusted to the many new functions of normal work. 
The question is then:  
 
 How do the informants perceive the current competence assessment? 
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4.2 Competence assessment as of today 
 
To be able to determine exactly how the informants view competence assessment, both in terms 
of the chosen assessment methodology as well as the perceived purpose of what is currently 
being assessed, a simplified picture was created to facilitate the discussion. Figure 5 illustrates 
three colour coded boxes, each containing a short description of a plausible approach to 
competence assessment. It should however be emphasised that the depiction of the three boxes 
does not represent a specific Safety-I or Safety-II perspective. It is merely a tool created to 
balance the informant’s perspective with the aim of exploring the transition between the two 
views on safety. 
 
Figure 5. Assessment methodology: The individual and the system                
 
 
All informants were presented with this picture and given a short introduction to each of the 
boxes and their associated implication. The conceptual model was introduced to frame the 
interview and develop a common level of understanding. An outline of the introduction is shown 
below; 
 
 The red box represents the mandatory prerequisite of assessing the competence of each 
individual ATCO 
 The blue box embodies an approach of creating awareness for further development of 
the individual ATCO and should be viewed as an add-on to the red box. The blue box 
thus symbolise a mind-set of actively increasing the ATCO’s consciousness pertaining to 
work performance. Further development of the individual is explored even though the 
ATCO is assessed as competent according to the defined performance objectives laid out 
in the red box. 
 The green box exemplifies a systemic focus which targets unit or systems specific issues. 
In this box the attention has shifted from an individual centred approach to a more 
holistic view of the functionality of the sociotechnical system itself. 
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The informants were asked if their unit’s competence assessment methodology included one or 
several of the previously described boxes. The answers showed some variation, however all 20 
informants clearly indicated that the red box is presently included in today’s competence 
assessment on all three units. This is not unexpected as there is a regulatory requirement 
governed by Commission Regulation (EU) No 805/2011, stating that “The competence of each 
air traffic controller shall be appropriately assessed at least every three years” (EASA, 2011, p.35).  
 
The data clearly confirmed the manifestation of the red box in all three units, irrespective of the 
assessment method being used. The next step was then to explore the presence of the 
surrounding boxes. The blue and the green boxes were designed to capture activities representing 
an assessment approach described in the Guidelines for competence assessment issued by 
Eurocontrol in 2005. It specifies that; “The purpose of competence assessment is to affirm 
competence and to identify areas in need of improvement as appropriate either in the individual 
or the system within which the individual works. Competence assessment supports the individual 
and the system” (EUROCONTROL, 2005, p.7). 
 
Though this document is merely issued as an EATMP Guideline and consequently not 
mandatory, it does provide a systemic perspective as it argues that competence assessment 
supports the individual and the system.  The question is whether the informants recognise this to 
be the case or not. The intention was therefore to collect data regarding the perceived assessment 
methodology, to examine if competence assessment is indeed viewed as something which 
supports the individual as well as the system.    
 
In the following section, data associated with the concept of competence assessment is presented 
as unit specific due to the difference in assessment methodology. This data was examined and 
categorised according to the chosen group structure and compared against each other. The data 
obtained from the two safety manager informants is not included in this comparison, as it was 
found to be inadequate due to their centralised company position. Both safety managers have an 
ATCO background, yet none of them have been working at the chosen research site and are 
thereby not familiar with the explicit details of the unit. Their data was thus judged as less 
relevant to this analysis.  
 
The results are presented below, firstly as a summarised table overview, and secondly as 
significant informant statements supporting the visualisation of the table content. Thirdly, key 
elements derived from the data are highlighted and analysed. In the table overview an X indicates 
group confirmation of the perceived presences of one or several of the previously described 
assessment approached illustrated in the contour of coloured boxes.  
 
 
4.2.1 Vienna APP 
 
Table 4. Vienna Approach overview 
 
VIENNA APP - Continuous 
assessment 
Assess the 
competence of the 
individual ATCO 
Help, guide and 
develop the 
individual 
ATCO 
Develop the 
system and 
look for gaps 
ATCO X   
ASSESSOR X  X 
MANAGEMENT X X  
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Before the continuous assessment was implemented it was just the red box. Now 
I don't know. I'm not quite sure if the green box is meant to be within the 
assessment. We are often discussing about how to bring the practice we do into 
procedures, to adapt procedures, but I'm not quite sure if this is within the 
assessment. We could be in the blue box if the assessor will give you feedback, but 
that has never happened so far. I would like to get feedback to know the system is 
running. I think the assessors should talk to the controllers once a year. If you 
never hear anything, you don't really know if your work is good, you are not able 
to improve yourself and improve your work). Continuous assessment is a better 
way than the previous dedicated check we had every 3 years. If you do it once 
every 3 years, that 1 or 2 hours you are being assessed, you can act or work 
differently than you do. So if the assessment is done continuously you are forced 
or you should work in a good way throughout the hours of work you do. It also 
depends upon who will be the assessors and who is choosing the assessors 
(Informant 1, ATCO). 
 
“When we had dedicated check, I didn't work with my normal behaviour. You are working 
completely different and it is not a good feeling” (Informant 2, ATCO).  
 
My feeling is that we are in the green box, but the blue box it not necessarily 
included. It starts with the green box and then inwards. So we are more in the 
green box and sometimes some relations to the blue. The main thing is the green 
box (Informant 7, Assessor). 
 
I think it’s the blue one! We tried to take a step towards the green one, but 
stepped back. We actually have no time for that. All the energy of the unit is used 
for the Top Sky system, since we are changing it in 2015. So we have no time to 
produce the step towards the green one (Informant 10, Management). 
 
 
The ATCO group paints a multifaceted picture of their competence assessment methodology. 
The continuous assessment is described as being better than the dedicated check since the 
ATCOs are required to work in a consistent way, making it impossible to divert from normal 
work and revert to Work-As-Imagined to satisfy the traditional requirements and measurements 
of Safety-I. The prior assessment structure of dedicated check was seen by all ATCO informants 
as a hindrance in terms of normal behaviour and normal work. One informant described it as 
“working completely different and it is not a good feeling” (Informant 2, ATCO), which could 
indicate the perception of a large gap between Work-As-Imagined and Work-As-Done. Despite 
the expressed contentment with the continuous assessment, the data showed that the ATCO 
informants were uncertain as to what is essentially being assessed apart from the red box. The 
presence of the blue and the green box could not be confirmed and it was emphasised that the 
lack of feedback is seen as an obstacle to individual improvement. The selection process of the 
assessors was mentioned as a critical parameter for the continuous assessment. The ATCO 
informants unanimously concluded that the assessors should be elected.  
 
The assessor and the manager clearly have dissimilar perceptions of what the continuous 
assessment is currently measuring. The assessor describes a focus devoted to the green box and is 
reluctant to include the blue box due to the new assessment structure; “If I give them feedback 
after a session, will it then technically be a dedicated check? I'm forced into saying nothing as 
long as nothing is bad” (Informant 7, Assessor).  
 
  
38 
The manager’s perception of being in the blue box could indicate an individualistic assessment 
perspective as oppose to a systemic outlook. The large scale change of operational system during 
2015 was briefly mentioned and could possibly be considered as a demotivational factor in terms 
of embracing a systemic view. There was however an identified need for the competence 
assessment scheme to help the operators understand something about safety of the new 
operation. When questioned if they actively use the competence assessment scheme to monitor 
changes in the operational environment, the management replied that they; “would like to use it 
as a tool for change, or to support some changes. But sometimes things are just implemented and 
the continuous assessment is quite new” (Informant 10, Management). 
 
The mentioned step towards the green box was not elaborated in detail and can therefore not be 
supported by additional data. Yet when asked whether the chosen assessment method or 
philosophy is presenting the organisation with a realistic picture of normal work or Work-As-
Done, the answer supported the blue box focus on the individual but could similarly indicate the 
beginning of a systemic observation; “it is definitely a realistic picture of what we are doing. It's 
safer now, because more eyes look at you and you definitely see potential problems and you can react 
earlier” (Informant 10, Management, emphasis added). 
 
One of the key questions posed in terms of exploring the concept of the competence assessment 
methodology was whether the informants perceived the competence assessment as supporting 
the individual, the system or both. The analysis of the data exposed a multiplicity of views both in 
terms of the assessment method being used, as well as the focus of what is currently being 
assessed. The approach unit in Vienna displayed the greatest spread in data concerning the focus 
and attention of the assessment. While the ATCOs are hesitant to place their assessment beyond 
the red box, the assessor defines his task as being more universal;  
 
I work according to a holistic impression of my colleagues. As a coordinating and 
planning controller you can watch and you see a lot of things. I do not do any 
kind of examinations. On our assessor meetings we can find and discuss hotspots, 
so we are alerted and will be looking a little bit closer. The idea is not to be 
checked every day (Informant 7, Assessor).  
 
A holistic approach to the colleagues and a systemic emphasis on hotspots support the study of 
normal work, which again were preferred by the ATCO informants. The management placed the 
assessment in the blue box with a reference to the limitations of implementing a new operational 
system during 2015. It was furthermore highlighted by management that; “The assessors focus 
on the person, not on the procedures. Procedure design is not their task, so they just look at how 
to use it, but not if the procedure is good and if it’s good for the time” (Informant 10, 
Management).  
 
The data unmistakably shows contradictory views of the perceived purpose of the current 
assessment methodology. A conceivable explanation could be the recent change from dedicated 
check to continuous assessment. At the time of the thesis research, the new assessment method 
had only been practiced for seven months and could be considered as still in the implementation 
phase. An interesting aspect worth pointing out is that the change of assessment method was 
initiated by the assessor group. It is described by management in the following way; “the pressure 
came from the local assessors saying, - ‘the dedicated check is worthless, we do not want to waste our time’ - 
so the development has come from the bottom up” (Informant 10, Management).   
 
The assessor group’s instigation of a new assessment approach could have emerged from an 
unpretentious desire to bridge the gap between Work-As-Imagined and Work-As-Done. This 
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would be in line with the Hollnagel’s argument that “seen from the sharp end it is no surprise 
that descriptions based on Work-As-Imagined cannot be used in practice and that actual work is 
different from prescribed work” (Hollnagel, 2014, p.41). It is similarly consistent with the 
ATCO’s statements regarding working completely different during a dedicated check. Since the 
assessor group evidently had a strong desire to transition from observing Work-As-Imagined on 
a random basis, to monitor Work-As-Done on a daily basis, their vision and expectations could 
have shaped a more holistic approach without anchoring it with management. This however 
could not be validated by the collected data, and is therefore purely speculation based upon a 
general impression from the interviews with management and assessor informants.    
 
The new assessment method was praised by all four ATCO informants who moreover had a few 
recommendations in regard to further development of the concept;  
 
The continuous assessment is pretty good, but I would improve some things. 
Each colleague should get a yearly assessment where the local assessors talk about 
his way of working (wrong & right). Notes are also important and the assessors 
should get tasks e.g. focus areas. They would then be able to give feedback to the 
authorities, the company and the ATCOs (Informant 1, ATCO). 
  
A feedback mechanism for the individual ATCO, as well as the system, is critical if the 
competence assessment shall succeed in supporting the individual and the system. The absence of 
a feedback process is experienced by the ATCOs as a hindrance to personal development and 
improvement. This gaping hole could easily be targeted through a feedback structure described 
by Barrett as Generative Competence; “The organization constructs integrative systems that 
allow members to see the consequences of their actions, to recognize that they are making a 
meaningful contribution, and to experience a sense of progress” (Barrett, 1995, p.40).  
 
The intention is to use an appreciative approach to increase empowerment and awareness of the 
individual in a high-performing organisation. This awareness or mindfulness is about the quality 
of attention as argued by Weick & Sutcliffe (2007). Yet mindfulness is not just seen in terms of 
the individual, it is “about the ability of a system to concentrate on what is going on here and 
now” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p.35).  
 
Within the competence assessment structure at Vienna APP, additional systemic issues were 
mentioned as being important. Not only was feedback identified as being essential, the assessor 
selection process and focus areas were also highlighted. These items are areas which could be 
explored further in a novel assessment method which conceivably is not fully developed thus far.   
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4.2.2 Malmö ATCC 
 
Table 5. Malmö ATCC overview 
 
MALMÖ ATCC - Dedicated check Assess the 
competence of the 
individual ATCO 
Help, guide and 
develop the 
individual 
ATCO 
Develop the 
system and 
look for gaps 
ATCO X X X 
ASSESSOR X X X 
MANAGEMENT X X (X)¹ 
 
¹Note: The brackets indicate that only one of the two informants has confirmed the manifestation of the green box.   
 
I think the assessment is present in all boxes. It is both about checking that the 
individual is at the required level, if not then he/she will receive help and 
guidance. But is it also about identifying frequent or systemic issues which can be 
improved. The assessment itself (the check) is perhaps in the red box, but if 
something emerges, then the individual will receive help whether it might be 
additional training or similar. The green box is represented by the yearly focus 
areas3 and the annual report4 which aims to inform about identified trends. Our 
continuation training5 is also part of the blue box (Informant 3, ATCO). 
 
We are in the red box during the observational part of the assessment, because 
our task is to sit behind, without interfering and simply observe and assess. The 
blue box comes into play during the debriefing. If we get many remarks6 within a 
certain area, then perhaps we need to change some procedure. You could possibly 
say that the annual report which describes the focus areas and the general 
impression could belong to the green box (Informant 8, Assessor). 
 
I think we are in the outer rim of the blue, close to the border to the green box. 
The objective is to help and guide the individual. I think the assessors are mostly 
in the blue. They want to raise the awareness of the individual that this is 
important, you have to improve. They are not thinking so much in the green area. 
Some of their ideas are in a systematic way, but they mostly want to increase the 
awareness of the individual (help & guide), that is why we have the remark thing 
(Informant 11, Management) 
                                                 
 
3 The yearly focus areas are determined by the Manager of Operations in cooperation with the assessor group. 
Typically there are three to five focus areas per year. The focus areas can vary between the different rating groups. 
 
4 The annual report is made by the assessor group. It is compilation of the yearly findings of the practical part of the 
competence assessment. The focus areas of that particular year are covered as well as additional discoveries. 
 
5 The competence assessment scheme demands that the ATCOs are trained within non-normal and emergency 
situations. The theoretical part of the competence assessment is conducted in conjunction with the simulator 
exercises. Additional training can be conducted as well, e.g. releases of new system software, etc. At Malmö ATCC 
this is called continuation training and is conducted yearly. 
 
6 In 2014 a remark item was introduced at Malmö ATCC by the assessor group in cooperation with management. 
Previously the grading was either Passed or Failed. With this new addition, there is now the possibility of passing the 
assessment with a standing remark. This remark will then be re-evaluated on the coming year’s assessment. The 
intention was to heighten the awareness of the individual as well as identifying systemic areas in need of 
improvement within the unit. 
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Spontaneously I reckon we are in the green box since we are very much interested in 
attaining information from the assessor group regarding the system (good & bad). Once a 
year the assessor group publishes a report where they look at the system and personnel 
holistically with a focus on how we can improve. They have on numerous occasions found 
gaps in procedures which then lead to a change according to their findings. If they see a 
potential trend, they will include this into next year’s focus areas. The red and blue box are 
presently covered (Informant 12, Management). 
 
The research conducted at Malmö ATCC provided strong evidence supporting the assumption of 
a common view of the competence assessment for all three group categories. The red box is 
exemplified by the dedicated check carried out in position (typically 2 times 1 hour).  
 
The blue box is seen in the context of two different aspects; the debriefing and the continuation 
training. At Malmö ATCC the debriefing is regarded as an essential part of the competence 
assessment and time is allocated to accommodate a debriefing of 45 – 60 minutes. All ATCOs are 
measured against well-defined performance objectives and these are raised and discussed during 
the debriefing. The continuation training was mentioned by the ATCOs as something which 
belongs to the blue box. A plausible explanation could be that the ATCOs view this training as 
an opportunity to receive professional development, since this is purely training and thus not 
assessed. The recent implementation of the remark item was described as helpful in increasing 
the awareness of the individual ATCO. 
 
The systemic view, represented by the green box, is defined by all three informant groups as the 
yearly focus areas and the annual report. The yearly focus areas are clearly vital in terms of 
identifying or anticipating potential trends. While discussing the focus areas, one of the 
management informants emphasised that; “What is more interesting is what they find in the 
focus areas. It’s the most valuable part, because that is where we can learn something” 
(Informant 11, Management).  
 
The annual report is interesting as it is presented and perceived by management as the assessors’ 
‘holistic view’ of the system and the ATCO personnel. The assessor group is similarly 
commended for discovering gaps in procedures and for their proactive approach in regard to the 
inclusion of new focus areas. Still the essential question must be whether the assessors’ annual 
report is backed up by other independent data and how this is linked to the daily operation? In 
order to investigate this area, the management informants were asked if they were confident that 
the Competence Assessment Scheme provided them with a representative picture of safety in 
their operation. One of the managers stated that;  
 
I’m fairly confident that it does, because the things the assessors find/detect, 
whether it is a focus area I have given them, or it is something that they 
themselves bring up in the annual report. It often shows the same picture that the 
reporting system shows me. They are often hand in hand, they correlate. So it 
gives me confirmation that we are focusing on the right things (Informant 11, 
Management).  
 
When exploring the data collected at Malmö ATCC, one is surprised by the remarkable 
uniqueness and coherence of the informants’ statements. The manifestation of all three boxes is 
confirmed not just in general terms, but through specific examples connected to each of the three 
dimensions of assessment. The exemplification of debriefing and continuation training as 
elements which support the development of the individual is explicit and tangible.  
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The systemic outlook is illustrated by all three informant categories as the yearly focus areas and 
the annual report. Even the newly implemented remark appears to be regarded as a constituent 
element that runs through the blue and the green dimension to facilitate a focused development. 
Management sees it as a tool to increase the awareness of the individual, and the assessors refer 
to it as an opportunity to change procedures. The assessors similarly describe the ATCOs as 
being “positive towards the new remark item” (Informant 8, Assessor). Like the assessor group 
in Vienna, it was the assessors who wanted to upgrade their assessment and thereby introduced 
the remark item as a complementary component to monitor or anticipate change. All assessors 
are licensed and operative controllers and can consequently be regarded as part of the sharp-end 
operators as they are well familiar with the complexity and constraints of normal work.  
 
What was furthermore found to be unique with Malmö was the amount of support and resources 
allocated to the assessor groups. The five groups have four yearly whole-day meetings where they 
all meet to discuss and share experiences. On top of this, the assessors of each rating groups are 
given four working days to compile their contribution to the annual report. The assessors 
describe the support in the following way: “Management appreciates the work we do and regards 
it as important. The manager is often present at our meetings due to his interest. He is very much 
giving us free hands to form the structure according to our preferences” (Informant 8, Assessor).  
 
This kind of empowerment is interesting in terms of the organisational and cultural aspects like 
information processing. Westrum (2004) suggests that the effects of the information flow climate 
are pervasive due to the key variables of; alignment, awareness and empowerment. He argues that; 
 
Generative organisations require empowerment for maximum performance. Individuals’ 
minds are harnessed to fulfil the organisation’s goals through a culture of conscious 
inquiry. They are encouraged to speak up, think outside the box, and to act as fully 
conscious participants in a great cooperative enterprise (P.24).  
 
This description is well suited for Malmö ATCC and it links back to the previously discussed 
topic of Generative competence and the importance of a well-functioning feedback structure. 
According to Westrum the alignment takes place through identification with the mission and 
awareness comes through conscious efforts to keep team members informed about all the 
variables that affect their efforts. He additionally describes Generative organisations as proactive 
in terms of information, more effective, more creative, more harmonious, and safer: “The reason 
is simple: the kind of conditions that create good information flow tend to be those that favour 
cooperation, creativity, and safety” (P.24). He concludes that not only will an open generative 
culture make the best use of its assets, it will have better acceptance of innovations and better 
response to danger signals: “A generative culture requires that alignment, awareness, and 
empowerment replace suspicion, isolation and passivity” (P.26). 
 
Malmö ATCC shows clear signs of being a generative organisation, with high generative 
competence through the core values of alignment, awareness and empowerment. In competence 
assessment the alignment can be represented by the briefing prior to the dedicated check. 
Awareness and empowerment is epitomised by the debriefing, the yearly focus areas and the 
annual report, along with the correlation of the findings from the reporting system.  
 
According to the informants, the current competence assessment methodology at Malmö ATCC 
actually do support the individual as well as the system. This operationalisation of all three 
dimensions could possibly be the basic framework from which it would be possible to explore a 
Safety-II way of conducting competence assessment. A motivational factor is that the ATCOs are 
very positive towards the existing practice; 
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Competence assessment is a good thing especially to ensure that we are working 
alike, so that no one develops a way of working which is different compared to 
everyone else. It is easier when there is a forum to identify possible deviations. I 
find that what we do today works really well, and I see no reason to change it! 
(Informant 3, ATCO) 
 
 
4.2.3 Inverness TWR 
 
Table 6. Inverness TWR overview 
 
INVERNESS TWR – Continuous 
assessment & Dedicated check 
Assess the 
competence of the 
individual ATCO 
Help, guide and 
develop the 
individual 
ATCO 
Develop the 
system and 
look for gaps 
ATCO X (X)¹ X 
ASSESSOR X X X 
MANAGEMENT X  X (X)² 
 
¹Note: The brackets indicate that only two of the three informants has confirmed the manifestation of the blue box. 
²Note: The brackets indicate that only one of the two informants has confirmed the manifestation of the green box.  
 
“We are in the red and the blue box. A little bit in the green, but it could be better, though they 
aim to be there” (Informant 4, ATCO). 
 
“All three gets done to a certain extend. I think it is a bit of all three and I'm not going to say that 
it is anyone of them” (Informant 5, ATCO). 
 
We certainly assess competence of the individual. I think we have systems in place 
to develop the unit. But what we don't have is the join between the two. We are 
not developing individuals, we are not good at joint up thinking as an 
organisation. We completely ignore the blue one (Informant 6, ATCO). 
 
We don't always manage it with the resources we have, but we are definitely and 
constantly discussing best practices and amending procedures so we are hopefully 
in the green box because we are doing that. We don't always get the chance to do 
that very quickly but we certainly and in a fairly consistent basis are updating what 
we are doing and changing it, passing out the information to the controllers. We 
are doing the blue and the red box as well (Informant 9, Assessor). 
 
For the unit, the green box is where we want to be and we use the competency 
system not only to assess the red area and the total interphase between the 
controller and the aircraft. But we have to at the end of the day to look at; are we 
giving the right and the correct guidance and material? What we do here is we allow 
the ATCOs issue an OSAR, which is an Operational SAfety Request/change. If 
they see something that they are not happy with or they believe could be done 
better, then they seek to a change. From a managers point of view I have to make a 
decision on either to agree to it or disagree. Now if I disagree I have to make a case 
as to why I have disagreed and I think that is very important. It puts me as a 
manager in an interesting situation because now I'm having to argue a case that in 
fact the procedure being adapted by the management may not be the best 
procedure to be adapted by the controllers in the operational position. So again I 
would like to see Inverness in the green box in relation to and benefitting from 
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conventional and traditional competency assessment of the individual, right down 
to the fact that we are able to change our procedures and policies in order to adapt. 
Every day we are striving to be in the green box, we do have a very open policy in 
relation to making that change and our procedures are evolving to deal with the 
competency of the unit (Informant 14, Management). 
 
The regulator is definitely in the red box. Inverness is in the blue box. We should 
be moving towards the green box. Competence to me is not just about the 
controller on a given day. It's about the opportunity that this presents the controller 
with. It's about the weaknesses, the latent weaknesses, it's about the strengths, and 
it’s about identifying how we can make his job better, easier, to have the right 
procedures, right equipment, right management structure, the right culture within 
the unit. All that comes together and the controller is only one of the elements 
(Informant 13, Management). 
 
The statements of the ATCO informants indicates an ambiguity connected to the presence and 
enactment of the three boxes. The boxes are described as being done to a certain degree, 
however there are no tangible examples to clarify this perception. One informant maintains that 
the presence of the blue box is non-existent “We are not developing individuals, we are not good 
at joint up thinking as an organisation. We completely ignore the blue one” (Informant 6, 
ATCO). The statement was not backed up by any mitigating suggestions or examples, making it 
problematic to speculate on a better course of action. Nevertheless the informant’s perception of 
not receiving further development should be taken seriously and considered when evaluating the 
unit’s competence assessment scheme.  
 
The ATCOs view of the green box were correspondingly equivocal and not exemplified in any 
way. One informant did comment that the assessment was; “a little bit in the green, but it could 
be better, though they aim to be there” (Informant 4, ATCO). The aim was not specified or 
elaborated, still it was suggested that the green box could be further developed in the following 
way; 
 
Maybe we should check and make sure that everything is anonymous, so they are 
not really checking any individual person, just checking how the system works, that 
should be done. Look at how strips are marked, listen to the tapes. If they are 
finding anything that is a bit non-standard, then they should provide general 
feedback (Informant 5, ATCO). 
 
The assessor informant displayed commitment to the green box by emphasising the frequent 
discussions concerning best practices along with the amendment and updating of procedures. 
This was described as “hopefully” placing Inverness in the green box. However there is evidence 
to suggest, from the interviews, that the individual is the focus of attention and not the system;  
 
I think the continuous assessment is a much more realistic way of dealing with 
our industry in a day-to-day basis because you are getting an overall feeling and a 
picture about the individuals concerned. It's much more likely to highlight any trends 
rather than the one-off assessment where the chances of something being picked 
up are reduced. Colleagues can understand that we spot things but they are much 
more unlikely to be acted upon if there is no system or a scheme to encompass 
that. (Informant 9, Assessor, emphasis added).  
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I think it's very valuable. I think the combination of the dedicated check with the 
samplings spread over the year gives the best overall picture of how an individual is 
performing. Certainly the one dedicated check a year is not really adequate. In an 
ideal world I think you would go more the other way and aim to eventually have 
the routine samplings sufficiently strong and regular that the annual situation of 
signing of a license is always just that (Informant 9, Assessor, emphasis added).  
 
These two quotes suggests that Inverness is very much geared towards the individual and not 
necessarily the system. The explanation could be found in the regulatory framework where there 
is a stringent demand of assessing ATCO competence and thus far not the systemic issues.  
 
The two management perspectives are not completely aligned concerning the green box, still 
there are distinctive statements pointing towards a systemic view comprising contextual aspects 
included in the managers’ area of responsibility. The OSAR (Operational Safety Request) is 
interesting as it offers the controllers an opportunity to actively seek a change of operational 
procedures. This in itself is perhaps not unique, however the managements’ view on how to 
handle an OSAR rejection indicates an awareness of the complexity and variance between Work-
As-Imagined and Work-As-Done. The manager informant clarified that;  
 
If there is a procedure or policy that we as managers have put in there, as we 
believed is going to be effective or efficient, and we discover that in fact it is 
difficult to work with from a controller’s point of view. Then we have to be open 
enough to be able to roll back and say – ‘well that is not working for us, we need 
to change it (Informant 14, Management). 
 
This is in line with the statement by the other management informant, where he stresses 
management’s role in identifying and ensuring how they can make the ATCOs job better and 
easier by having the right procedures, equipment, management structure and the right culture 
within the unit.  
 
The summarised table overview of Inverness TWR could at first hand give one the impression 
that there is consensus among the informants in regard to the perceived purpose and focus of the 
competence assessment. Yet when exploring all statements, a discontinuity between the three 
groups emerge as they clearly all have different views. There are very few palpable examples or 
patterns which describe the operationalisation of the three dimensions. The informant groups 
appear to have diverse perceptions on the usability and effectiveness of the assessment process. 
One of the ATCOs states that; 
 
It works to a degree. I'm not convinced that it is currently picking up all the 
changes. We need to come up with a system of feeding back experience from 
other units into our own at the grass-root level and that is not currently happening 
(Informant 6, ATCO) 
 
Sharing experience with other units or interrelated domains seem important for the ATCOs, as 
this is perceived as an element which would broaden the usefulness of competence assessment;  
 
I think competence assessment should be wider than just simply sitting and 
assessing if someone is doing their job. I think you should have the opportunity to 
discuss theoretical situations, it would be great if this could include more domains 
than just controllers (Informant 4, ATCO). 
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A direct inclusion of other domains in the competence assessment scheme is an interesting 
notion as it would display understanding and acceptance of both the coupling and complexity of 
external actors like the UK RAF airbase Lossiemouth. The close location of the airbase was 
identified as an operational challenge by all informants as the traffic is more complex, the radar 
cannot cope, consequently demanding frequent adjustments and adaptations of the ATCOs. This 
is in line with Perrow’s argument that the airways system is potentially quite complex; 
“unexpected interactions can occur when aircraft enter the airspace that are not under the control 
of ATC or even not seen by them. This is a proximity problem”. (1984, p.159). Including external 
actors both through discussion, or by creating fictions scenario interviews, could perchance 
enhance a loose coupling between ATC and the military traffic and thereby ensure the ability to 
recover from small failures (Perrow, 1984).  
 
The scenario interview element is recommended by EUROCONTROL as something which can 
be used to confirm understanding and gather information on how a “controller would have 
reacted in circumstances that were not observable but are nevertheless considered important to 
the overall operation at that Unit” (EUROCONTROL, 2005, p. 12). This type of scenario 
interviews are currently used with great success during competence assessment of ATSEP7 
personnel. The scenario interview structure has been incorporated and further developed to 
accommodate the challenge of not always being able to conduct realistic assessments settings in 
offline systems.  
 
Building scenarios with the purpose of exploring systemic issues in addition to the operator’s role 
and constraints while working within this system, will aid a transition from an individual to a 
systemic perspective. For an assessor this could be a valuable tool as the structure in Inverness 
appears to be tailored around the individual and not the system. According to the assessor 
informant the scenario interview is presently included in the yearly dedicated check, where the 
ATCO is asked to; “explain different scenarios of ‘what would you do if’...?” (Informant 9, 
Assessor). This type of questions could however result in an answer reflecting Work-As-
Imagined and not Work-As-Done, unless the purpose of the scenario interviews has been clearly 
defined. The aim should not be to hunt errors but to appreciate the local rationality principle of 
each operator, as it will provide information of actions which are systematically connected to 
features of the work environment the ATCOs are working in (Dekker, 2011). 
 
From the data and the informants’ comments it is highly probable that Inverness can be 
categorised as a bureaucratic organisation as defined by Westrum (2004), as he argues that 
bureaucracy is often a compromise between competing interests.   
 
At Inverness this could perhaps explain the lack of shared awareness among the different 
informant groups. Fruhen et al. (2013) describe characteristics of skills, knowledge and senior 
managers’ safety commitment as something which can; 
 
…be stimulated to develop their ability to understand safety problems, to consider 
different types of information sources, to creatively generate solutions for safety problems 
and to be sensitive to others’ intentions and issues as this is likely to support their 
demonstration of safety commitment (p.7).  
 
Considering new sources of information could facilitate a transition from bureaucratic towards a 
generative communication and information flow, where alignment, awareness and empowerment 
                                                 
 
7 ATSEP is an abbreviation for Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel who operate and maintain ATM equipment 
approved for operational use. 
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help the organisation archive its safety goals. It could conceivably enable a shift towards an 
organisational joint up thinking as called upon of one of the ATCO informants.  
 
The assessment structure in Inverness, with the yearly dedicated check and the monthly 
samplings, is not only suitable for monitoring the individual, it could, with some adjustments, be 
used to monitor the system as a whole. The system is in place with allocated resources and a 
committed assessor team. One of the ATCOs even describe the assessment form as “less nerve 
wrecking having the continuous assessment because it is done by colleagues and you've got a 
better working relationship with them” (Informant 4, ATCO).  
 
Based upon statements from the management it is moreover evident that they are dedicated 
towards providing the right working environment, culture and openness. To ensure that 
competence assessment can support the individual as well as the system it is imperative to also 
look beyond the scope of rule compliance and embrace the reality of work day in day out. 
 
 
4.3. Competence and competence assessment in consonance with Safety-II 
 
For the purposes of this research Safety-II is considered to be what is proposed in Hollnagel 
(2013a & 2014) as well as the two White papers published by EUROCONTROL (2013 & 2014).  
 
Safety-II is characterised by a shift in perspective in terms of how the system performs and 
adapts under varying conditions. Safety-I is characterised by minimising the number of negative 
events and safety interventions, invariably by reducing and eliminating human error. The 
difference between these two approaches to safety has an impact on what form competence and 
competence assessment takes in a Safety-II paradigm. The subject is clouded by the fact that for 
some time to come, there will be a need for competence and competence assessment to support 
both approaches to safety.  
 
4.3.1 What is competence in Safety-II?  
 
Competence – a word or a concept we all seem to understand without having the need to elaborate 
or explain it further. We all know what we are talking about since we unquestionably recognise it 
when we see it, - or do we? 
 
Within Air Traffic Control, competence has traditionally been regarded as Knowledge and Skill. In 
simplified terms, - you need to know the rules and how to apply them! Taking ESARR 5 into account, will 
add the notion of Experience to the constituent parts of ATCO competence. This trio works nicely 
in a Safety-I environment, where compliance can be viewed in terms of the individual and 
measured against the standards of Work-As-Imagined.  
 
Safety-II is primarily concerned with the system’s ability to succeed under varying conditions 
(EUROCONTROL, 2013). The contrast of having the systems view and not the individual view, 
could easily question the role and relevance of competence. It is therefore important to ask what 
competence means in a Safety-II environment.  
 
Safety-II recognises that the work situations of today are increasingly intractable and that in order 
to ensure and sustain successful outcomes, people must be flexible and adjust their performance 
to the current conditions. Performance adjustments are viewed as something which takes place 
every day and it will consequently vary. Hollnagel (2014) argues that there are three main 
motivations for making performance adjustments; 
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 To maintain/create good working conditions. “the more stringent the demands to work output 
are, the more effort is put into ensuring that these conditions are in place” (p.158) 
 To compensate for something that is missing. Compensating for unacceptable conditions, 
missing equipment, information underload or perhaps lack of time. Irrespectively of what 
might be missing, the individual will search for a way to substitute or compensate.  
 To avoid future problems. Adjusting to avoid negative consequences for the individual, the 
group or the organisation. 
These three types of performance adjustments are seen as an integrated part of Work-As-Done, 
and could for that reason also be argued as requisite Safety-II competencies. Understanding 
Work-As-Done is one of the key elements of Safety-II, but in order to truly comprehend Work-
As-Done, one must examine the operational environment and the contextual strains embedded 
in the ATCOs day-to-day work. A conceivable way of doing this could be through the enactment 
of competence assessments in agreement with Safety-II as a supporting or collaborative 
mechanism to exploring Work-As-Done.  
 
4.3.2 Competence Assessment in accordance with Safety-II 
 
It has previously been argued that the synthesis of competence elements pertaining to Work-As-
Imagined and Work-As-Done requires versatility in order to cope with complexity and the 
monitoring of different skills. The structure of how the six competence elements can be assessed 
or monitored will be explored in this section. 
 
Measuring competence was seen by the majority of the informants as problematic. Many lacked a 
clear definition, thereby making it abstract and difficult to quantify. A small number of 
informants found it less complex as they were measuring against predefined performance 
objectives. Irrespective of approach or method being used, it is vital to differ between 
competence elements that are suitable for assessment or measurement, and those that are not.  
 
In the six stage competence model, the Skill- and Knowledge-based competence elements epitomise 
the rule and compliance based mind-set of Work-As-Imagined. Both competencies are well 
suited for practical as well as theoretical assessment. The process of doing so will be aided by the 
use of performance objectives and should hence be considered to ensure a fair and objective 
measurement. 
 
For the purpose of exploring Safety-II in terms of competence assessment, the remaining four 
competence elements are more interesting and relevant, as they can provide significant insight 
into Work-As-Done. If approached correctly, they can be a source of information regarding 
potential changes within the operational environment. However two fundamental questions 
remain. Firstly, can the new competencies be validated as elements associated with Safety-II?  
Secondly, should these four competencies be assessed in the same way as the Skill- and 
Knowledge-based competence? 
 
The review of the literature on Safety-II resulted in six key features of Safety-II. Where the aim 
was to enhance understanding of; 
 
 Why things go right 
 Work-As-Done  
 Approximate adjustments  
 Performance variability 
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 People as a resource to ensure flexibility 
 Trade-offs 
These key features are used to validate the last four competence elements and their appositeness 
in terms of Safety-II. 
 
The new competence elements of Adaptive- and Service-driven competence are constructed to 
incorporate central aspects of Safety-II. These competence mechanisms can provide a means of 
calibrating the view of the operational environment providing insight into the dynamics of the 
system by exploring trade-offs, approximate adjustments and adaptations as well as performance 
variability. An example could be, that with the purpose of avoiding future problems – 
performance adjustments are made to avoid negative consequences. In order to identify this kind 
of performance adjustment one would need to have a feedback mechanism. With the new six 
stage competence model, the element of Adaptive competence would be able to identify and 
appreciate this kind of performance adjustment. Understanding every day activities is important 
as Work-As-Done is always underspecified. According to Hollnagel (2015) “the 
underspecification is intentional in relation to the granularity of work descriptions. Here it is 
always necessary to take some basic skill and competence for granted and therefore exclude them 
from instructions or procedures” (p.254) 
 
In terms of competence as seen from a Safety-I view, everything is specified and prescribed. In 
Safety-II it is quite different. Safety-II is about the messy details of an imperfect world of 
imperfect information and the practicalities of uncertainties. From this we can draw that 
competence is how a function or an organisation interacts with others. Along with how it uses its 
capabilities to sustain an effective and safe operation ensuring that things go right. Some aspects 
that are seen as negative artefacts of Safety-I, may be seen a positive artefacts of Safety-II. An 
illustration taken from the Service-driven competence, is the ATCO statement saying that: 
“Competence is not only to work safe, though safe is very important in our job. For competence 
it is also necessary to work in a normal speed” (Informant 2, ATCO). Here it is implied that you 
have to make trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness in order to be competent.  
 
Providing a good service is seen as an important skill and therefore you adapt. A Safety-I view is 
more focused on consistency – you do not make trade-offs and you do not borrow from safety. 
In Safety-II it could be the case, that without breaking the rules, you might think creatively of 
how you can expand your capability for a short period and then recover. In Safety-II, recovery 
back to some normative state is a really important part which is missing from Safety-I altogether. 
The explanation for this can be found in the contrasting view of the human operator. Whereas 
Safety-I view the human as a potential liability or hazard, Safety-II recognise the operator as an 
asset, a necessary resource for system flexibility and resilience (EUROCONTROL, 2013).  
 
The role of the operator relates to the Social competence element in the model. Safety-II is about 
the effectiveness of the system and not the individual per se. Even so, working in a system with 
many interdependencies and many actors, requires a certain amount of social competence of all 
individuals involved. The value of interactions are increasingly viewed and valued as being 
fundamental for guaranteeing good cooperation and thereby ensuring an effective teamwork. It 
was emphasised by some of the informants that the operational performance adjustments greatly 
depended on colleagues and the team; “If you have the right shift, the right colleagues by your 
side, you do not even have to talk to each other” (Informant 1, ATCO). Social competence has 
got a much wider implication than competence assessment of technical skills since it is also about 
how ATCOs and managers interact with each other in terms of openness and honesty, as 
previously confirmed by a manager informant. This insight could facilitate internal discussions of 
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how effective a system is. The notion of Social competence might not be very tangible, still all 
informant groups included this element as an important part of defining competence. 
 
The Experience-based competence has formerly been mentioned as an integrated part of the 
ESARR 5 competence definition and has as a result of this, been linked to Work-As-Imagined. In 
many respects it could be argued that that Experience-based competence is better placed among 
the elements of Work-As-Done, since it adds the acumen of operational experience.  Building on 
Hutton & Klein’s (1999) notion that expertise is experience dependant, will augment the use of 
ATCOs as experts navigating the system with all its complexities on a daily basis. This is similarly 
in line with Shorrock et al. in (EUROCONTROL, 2014) and their recommendation of field 
expert involvement as they are a critical source of safety knowledge. Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) and 
Dekker (2015) refer to this as deference to expertise. Dekker argues that “if people are not a 
problem to control, but a resource to harness, then taking their experience and expertise seriously 
is a strong first step” (Dekker, 2015, p.251). Recognising ATCOs as expert informants, with a 
vast amount of knowledge concerning the gaps between Work-As-Imagined and Work-As-Done, 
is essential in order to sustain operations and ensure a future increase in system capacity. 
 
Mapping the six key Safety-II features against the new competence elements confirmed that there 
are indeed a strong correlations between them. The informants complemented the classic 
competence model with additional competencies which have proven to be in line with the key 
features of Safety-II. This validates the relevance of the six stage competence model and answers 
the first of the previously posed questions. 
 
The second and last question pertains to the assessment method of the remaining four elements. 
Perhaps one might ask whether it is indeed possible to measure Adaptive, Service-driven, Social 
and Experience-based competence? It could perchance be feasible if applying a reductionist 
approach, however it is far from the core values of Safety-II. A cornerstone of Safety-II is an 
emphasis of talking to people about their work. Their work is characterised by an environment 
which is constantly changing, meaning they constantly have to adjust. This cannot be viewed 
through a ruleset, it has to be explored through talking to people. This is in agreement with 
(EUROCONTROL, 2014) stating that; 
 
Discussion with field experts is essential to understand why things work in the 
way that they work. Discussion may follow an observed period of work, or may 
relate to work and the system more generally, including activities, situations, 
occurrences or scenarios (p.28).  
 
Setting the scene for obtaining this kind of information is crucial in order for the ATCO to feel 
comfortable in passing information on how the system is behaving. An appropriate scene would 
be a debriefing based upon the six stage competence model as this includes the perspective of 
Work-As-Done. Understanding the quintessence of the six Safety-II features can be done 
through the four competence elements, provided that these are approached in an appreciative 
and lenient way.  
 
The content of a debriefing has traditionally been based purely on what was observed during the 
practical part of the competence assessment. If the session has been uneventful, the debriefing 
will with great likelihood be short and only consist of a short feedback session and signing of 
papers. One could easily argue that there could be an element of adjusting performance according 
to Work-As-Imagined and thereby ensuring standardised performance, which meet the intended 
requirements of measurement. This approach is not compatible with an assessment conducted 
from a Safety-II perspective, as the debriefing will play an increasingly and more important role. 
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The four elements of Adaptive, Service-driven, Social and Experience-based competence are key aspects 
to be facilitated during the debriefing. Although some of the elements might not be observed 
during the practical part of the assessment, they should still be investigated and targeted through 
the use of focus areas and scenario type questions. The purpose it not to measure or evaluate 
performance, it is more to gain an understanding of how and why the ATCOs adjust their 
performance on a day to day basis.  
 
Embracing the new six stage competence model will facilitate a transition from the traditional 
Safety-I approach towards a Safety-II framework where the daily activities of work can be 
explored. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
The aspiration of this thesis was to investigate if the mandatory competence assessment of Air 
Traffic Controllers can be utilised, as a means of transitioning from the traditional Safety-I 
methodology of exclusively assessing the individual, towards a Safety-II approach where the 
interaction between the ATCO and the system is incorporated.  
 
The research disclosed a need for calibrating the traditional view of competence, as well as a 
prerequisite of recognising and embracing new competencies. A proposal was derived from the 
research data and is presented in this thesis as the six stage competence model in Figure 4. The 
elements of Adaptive, Service-driven and Social competence emerged from the data as the 
informants described how coping with the complexity of a constantly changing traffic picture 
requires flexibility, adaptability, efficiency and teamwork. Considering that these are features of 
Work-As-Done, they should be appreciated and understood as significant constituents of 
competence. It is essential to find the appropriate method of assessing these new elements, as 
measuring competence is an area which is both multifaceted and underspecified in respect of 
well-grounded assessment tools suitable to encompass elements of Work-As-Done.  
 
The introduction of new competencies accentuates that the competence assessment scheme 
needs versatility to be able to cope with complexity and change. The nature of competence will 
change in the years ahead, as significant and far reaching systemic changes are coming. The 
competence assessment scheme needs to be consistent with the changes in technology and the 
changing ATCO skill set. Complying with the traditional Safety-I approach of constraining 
performance variability and enforcing strict procedure compliance is counterproductive in the 
operational systems of today. Amalberti argues that:  
 
The ultimate robustness or resilience of the system is always based on the 
remaining adaptive capacity of the actors. It is important to ensure that they are 
not strait-jacketed by unnecessary procedures, since each procedure slightly 
reduces the adaptive capacity of the system (Amalberti, 2013, p.128).   
 
As the skill sets change, new competences will be required and the assessment or measurement of 
these must then follow. Moreover, the nature or philosophy of the competence assessment 
scheme itself has potential to change and support the management of change that ATM will be 
required to undertake. 
 
Preceding the commencement of collecting research data, a hypothesis was developed, 
speculating if continuous assessment would be better suited for recognising Safety-II system 
dynamics such as performance adjustments, performance variability and adaptations. It was 
therefore of particular interest to examine if the units that are currently using continuous 
assessment have procedures and tools in place to monitor these system dynamics. The 
assumption was based upon Hollnagel’s argument that “effective monitoring requires both that 
there is time available, and that there is a monitoring strategy, and that the people or operators 
involved have the requisite skills and knowledge” (Hollnagel, Pariès, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011, 
p.293). The investigation showed that although the continuous assessment provides an ideal 
timeframe, the monitoring strategy mainly revolves around the individual and not the system. It 
was similarly found that knowledge concerning system dynamics like trade-offs and performance 
variability was minimal. The data disclosed that continuous assessment does not necessarily mean 
that the organisation is better at monitoring systemic interactions between the ATCO and the 
system as a whole.  
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Competence assessment is conducted not only to assess the competence of the individual, it is 
correspondingly the aim to assess the competence of the system (EUROCONTROL, 2005). 
Safety-II has an emphasis on the coupling between the individual and the system, hence the 
structure of the competence assessment should reflect this emphasis. Comprehending the 
coupling between the two, places a focus on understanding what is ‘normal’, to understand what 
is unusual (Hollnagel, 2015a). This is also in agreement with Perrow’s argument that “we should 
be sensitive to trivial events in nontrivial systems” (1984, p.43). Information concerning trivial 
events can only be provided by the people working within the system. Recognising the ATCOs as 
system informants is important to ensure that competence assessment support the individual as 
well as the system. This relates back to the previous discussion of the versatility of the 
competence assessment scheme. The current EASA regulation is focused on the individual level 
and should be raised to the systems level. In order for the competence assessment scheme to 
work, it needs to have the regulatory perspective that recognises the systemic view.  
 
Whatever form or format we need for Safety-II, it has got to be proportionate since time and 
money are limited assets. The competence assessment scheme can provide a structure without 
spending additional resources on observational safety surveys. Observational surveys or 
techniques can to some extent provide a Safety-II framework, if they base their observations on 
Work-As-Done. The research of this thesis has however shown that good feedback mechanisms 
and talking to people is more important than just observing. An observer does not have 
privileged access to the operators mind and actions, partly due to the high level of automation. It 
is therefore vital to have a good debriefing structure to maximise learning. Since competence 
assessment is a mandatory requirement, the resources are already allocated, and this favours the 
competence assessment scheme as an instrument for Safety-II deployment. Combining the 
elements of observation and discussion is similarly conforming to the recommendations of 
Shorrock et al. in (EUROCONTROL, 2014) in terms of understanding Work-As-Done and 
systems thinking. Including a systems view will provide the organisation with vital information 
concerning performance variability, adaptations and thus Work-As-Done.  
 
Looking back at the research conducted at the three sites, with differing assessment methods, it 
becomes clear that this diversity has contributed greatly in defining enablers of Safety-II. The 
research showed, that in order to understand Work-As-Done and why things go right, in addition 
to approximate adjustments and performance variability, the organisation must have suitable 
feedback mechanisms to both access and share information. The notion of generative 
competence (Barrett, 1995) in combination with mindfulness as described by Weick & Sutcliffe 
(2007) can augment awareness and empowerment of the individual in a high-performing 
organisation. Westrum (2004) argues that high cooperation and risk sharing ensures alignment, 
awareness and empowerment within a performance oriented organisation. Organisations that are 
able to process information and adhere to this kind of information flow are labelled as generative. 
Generative competence in a generative organisation acknowledge people as a key resource in the 
same way as is the emphasis in Safety-II.  
 
When investigating the competence assessment scheme and methodology of the three research 
sites, one of them stood out as a result of the consistency of the informants’ statements. 
Independently of each other, all informant groups described the same features connected to the 
operationalisation of the unit’s assessment methodology. Specific examples of elements which 
support the assessment and development of the individual, as well as the system, were given. The 
research data indicates that this site is effectively operating mechanisms that allow them to learn, 
not just on the individual level, also the level of the system. The informants feel they have the 
opportunity to provide feedback, which is then used with the prospective purpose of 
understanding and improving the unit. The described framework is that of Malmö ATCC. Their 
  
54 
competence assessment scheme could be considered the closest to a competence assessment 
scheme which incorporates feedback mechanisms both on the individual and systemic level. A 
similar structure could conceivably enable or facilitate a transition from Safety-I to a synthesis of 
Safety-I and Safety-II. The competence assessment scheme at Malmö ATCC is not flawless, there 
are still areas which should be developed further in order to fully embrace Safety-II. New 
competencies must be recognised and incorporated. The question is also whether the assessment 
method of using dedicated check could be advanced and improved by changing to continuous 
assessment? A change to continuous assessment would place them more in line with how they 
presently conduct all their unit training.  
 
The topic of training brings in a future challenge which was identified during the research. Today 
we are training people according to the elements of Work-As-Imagined and thereby the features 
Safety-I.  
 
A potential research areas for future studies could be the role of training in a Safety-II 
environment. Essential questions one could pose are;  
 
 At what stage during training should Safety-II be introduced and promoted?  
 Should the given training be mapped against Work-As-Done? 
 Will the competence assessment need a different structure to compensate for the trainees 
lack of experience during the first year? 
 Could the On the Job Training Instructor (OJTI) be the instrument of getting Safety-II 
into the organisation?  
The trainees will, to a vast extent, get their safety knowledge from the OJTIs during their 
training.  The role of training, the role of the OJTI and the role of competence assessment seen 
through a Safety-II lens, is well worth exploring. It could be that the concept of competence 
assessment is entirely redundant in a future where complexity and interconnectivity requires a 
different kind of information sharing. 
 
Competence assessment conducted in accordance with Safety-II will provide vital information 
about the effectiveness of the unit’s operation. However in order to optimise and benefit from 
this, managers of ANSPs need to understand that they have a new source of information, a new 
source of safety intelligence that can be used. Their interaction and relationship with the 
workforce, or system informants, can reduce the burden and make the system more effective.   
In order to really make the most out of a Safety-II approach it will require preparation and 
training of managers, safety managers and assessors. The ATCOs should be involved and 
included in certain parts of the process, to build trust and increase awareness of the Safety-II 
principles. The evidence gained from this research would indicate that the role and structure of 
debriefing along with other potential effective feedback mechanisms, will play a significant part in 
deriving the understanding of how the system behaves. In order to achieve this, all actors in the 
chain of competence assessment will need appropriate training to ensure consistent application of 
the six stage competence model. This is to make clear the responsibilities and expectations 
associated with the new flow of information. 
 
At this moment in time competence assessment is not used to the full extent possible. There is 
still great potential in examining the dynamics of the system and placing an emphasis on 
understanding why things go right. The competence assessment scheme can play an important 
role in understanding Safety-II, and it can correspondingly act as a facilitator for an effective 
transition of change management.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the exploration of the thesis question it became evident that for the competence assessment to 
transition from Safety-I to Safety-II, new competencies must be recognised and the coupling 
between the individual ATCO and the system must be understood more in depth. The six stage 
competence model can help facilitate the process and at the same time increase knowledge and 
understanding of Work-As-Done. The competence elements of the model are: 
 
 Skill-based competence 
 Knowledge-based competence 
 Experience-based competence 
 Adaptive competence 
 Service-driven competence 
 Social competence 
A prerequisite for the utilisation of the six stage competence model, is the recognition of the 
ATCOs as System informants. In Safety-II, the human operator is seen “as a resource necessary 
for system flexibility and resilience” (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 147).  
 
The mind-set by which competence assessment is presently conducted is rooted in compliance 
and procedural adherence, thereby giving very little space for understanding normal work. 
Emphasis and attention is predominantly placed on the individual, not the system. A transition 
towards a Safety-II approach is hence reliant on a shift in focus to embrace and include the 
systems view, a fundamental philosophy of Safety-II.  
 
In its current form and state, competence assessment of air traffic controllers do not fully 
support or provide the framework for exploring and understanding performance variability and 
adaptation. The necessity and relevance of both performance variability and adaptive capacity 
were confirmed by the informants, and should therefore be acknowledged as a means of ensuring 
robustness and resilience of the system as argued by Amalberti (2014). The element of Adaptive 
competence was constructed to incorporate these central Safety-II aspects. 
 
The data collected from the ATCO informants furthermore provided significant evidence of 
efficiency/thoroughness trade-offs, as ATCOs clearly distinguish themselves as being efficient 
and service-oriented rather than strictly rule compliant. This supports Hollnagel’s argument that 
people will choose the more efficient mode of operation, providing it is perceived as safe (2009). 
The element of Service-driven competence was designed to provide the organisation with 
essential information on daily trade-offs used to ensure an efficient and safe operation. 
 
The competence assessment scheme has potential, with the support of the six stage competence 
model, to facilitate a transition towards Safety-II through the investigation and understanding of 
Adaptive and Service-driven competence. Both competence elements integrate central aspects of 
Safety-II and can offer insight into these critical aspects, provided they are approached with an 
appreciative mind-set and a focus on understanding why thing go right. The transition to Safety-
II will for the foreseeable future coexist with Safety-I. It must similarly be acknowledged that the 
classic safety paradigm has yielded significant safety benefits to ATM. Therefore the transition 
will not be to Safety-II alone, it will be a transition to a blend of Safety-I and Safety-II. The six 
stage competence model represents a synthesis of competence elements associated with the 
features of Work-As-Imagined and Work-As-Done, as both approaches to safety will need to be 
supported in competence assessment of air traffic controllers. A competence assessment scheme 
with a combined emphasis on the individual and the system, will play an important part in the 
transition from Safety-I to the new world of Safety-II and a competence assessment synthesis.  
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9.2 Appendix 2: Interview guide Vienna APP - ATCO 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
o Why did you change from dedicated check to continuous assessment? 
 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
o How is this measured? 
 
Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated implication. 
 
6. If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which 
one would you choose? 
o Please elaborate! 
  
Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
 
7. What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand 
the performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
D) ATCO 
 
8. Could you briefly describe the way you work during a normal working day and one where you 
work with a Competence Assessor? 
o Do they differ? - If yes, in what way? 
 
9. How would you describe the operational environment? 
o Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? 
o If yes, please give an example! 
 
10. How often do you need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific situation? 
o How predictable are these situations? 
o Can you prepare for them? 
o Please give an example of how you adjust your performance 
o Could you specify the reason why you would need to adjust your performance? 
o Would you do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment? 
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11. Could you describe a typical situation (working with traffic) where you would trade-off 
thoroughness for efficiency? 
o Would you do the same trade-off during a competence assessment? 
12. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
13. How would you describe the linkage between Competence Assessment and the following four 
actions; 
o Monitor 
o Respond 
o Learn 
o Anticipate 
 
14. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between 
practice and procedure? (refrase) 
o If yes, in what way? 
 
15. In your experience, how do you think the management and the safety department view the 
function of the Competence Assessment? 
o In what way do they use the yearly findings? 
16. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the 
organisation with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
17. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the 
purpose of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance 
adjustments, adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
18. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for 
my research connected to Competence Assessment? 
  
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.3 Appendix 3: Interview guide Vienna APP - ASSESSOR 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
o Why did you change from dedicated check to continuous assessment? 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? How is this measured? 
 
Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated implication. 
 
6. If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one 
would you choose? Please elaborate! 
Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
 
7. What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? ((Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
D) ASSESSOR 
 
8. Could you briefly describe how you work as a competence assessor? (continuous assessment) 
o How were you selected? 
o Do you have dedicated days for observations? (Targeted days or a holistic impression?) 
o Do you observe all colleagues? 
o Is briefing part of the concept? 
 
9. Do you use Performance Objectives? 
o If yes, please give an example! - If no, why not? 
 
10. Do you have yearly focus areas? 
o If yes, are these communicated to your colleagues? - If no, why not? 
 
11. Do you use the Scenario Interview? 
o If yes, in what way? If no, - why not? 
 
12. What would you describe as characteristic findings in a Competence Assessment?  
o How are these communicated to the colleagues? 
o And to management? 
o What do you do if there is competence in doubt? 
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13. Do your colleagues get any yearly individual feedback? 
 
14. How would you describe the operational environment? 
o Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? 
o Please give an example! 
15. How often do you see your colleagues adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific situation? 
o How predictable are these situations? 
o Can they prepare for them? 
o Could you give an observed example of how your colleagues adjust their performance? 
o Could you specify the reason why they need to adjust their performance? 
o Would they do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a dedicated check? 
 
16. Could you describe a typical situation (that you have observed) where your colleagues would trade-off 
thoroughness for efficiency? 
o Would they do the same trade-off during a dedicated check? 
 
17. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
18. How would you describe the linkage between Competence Assessment and the following four 
actions; 
o Monitor 
o Respond 
o Learn 
o Anticipate 
 
19. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? 
o If yes, in what way? – If no, why not? 
 
20. In your experience, how do you think the management and the safety department view the function 
of the Competence Assessment? 
o In what way do they use the yearly findings? 
 
21. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
22. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done?  
o Please elaborate! 
23. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
24. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.4 Appendix 4: Interview guide Vienna APP - MANAGEMENT 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.  Please state your name and work position? 
2.  Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3.  Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
o Why did you change from dedicated check to continuous assessment? 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
o How is this measured? 
Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated implication. 
If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one would 
you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
D) MANAGEMENT 
 
6. How confident are you that the Competence Assessment Scheme provides you with a representative 
picture of safety in the operation? 
 
7. Do you use the Competence Assessment Scheme to assure yourself of changes in the operational 
environment? - How? 
 
8. How do you anticipate or expect the Competence Assessment Scheme to support those undergoing 
the change? 
 
9. How would you describe the operational environment? (In order to determine if the view of the 
operational staff and management differ) 
 
10. Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? 
 
11. How often do you think the controllers need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific 
situation? - How predictable are these situations and can they prepare for them? 
 
12. Are you aware of how and why the controllers adjust their performance? Do you think they would do 
the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment (dedicated check)? 
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13. Does Work-As-Imagined/designed and Work-As-Done, and the difference therein, matter to you? If 
so why? 
 
14. Do you consider trade-offs as a means of assuring safe operation? If yes, in what way? 
 
15. Would the ATCOs do the same trade-off during a competence assessment? 
 
16. What contribution to lesson learning, does your competence assessment scheme make? 
 
17. How do you assess the Competence Assessment in terms of making progress on safety?  
 
18. Do you have a process/technique for understanding the success of everyday activity as a method for 
understanding failure? 
 
19. Have you identified a difference in data from the dedicated check to the continuous assessment? 
 
20. How do you use the assessor’s findings? (Please exemplify) 
 
21. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
22. How would you describe the linkage between Competence Assessment and the following four 
actions; 
o Monitor 
o Respond 
o Learn 
o Anticipate 
 
23. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? – If no, why not? 
 
24. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
25. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
26. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
27. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview! 
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9.5 Appendix 5: Interview guide Vienna APP - SAFETY MANAGER 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
o Why did you change from dedicated check to continuous assessment? 
 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? How is this measured? 
 
6. Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. 
If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one 
would you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
7. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
D) SAFETY MANAGER 
 
8. Could you describe how you view the link between Competence Assessment and your role and 
responsibility as a Safety Manager? 
 
9. How effective is the Competence Assessment Scheme? 
 
10. Is it used for the management of change? (If new systems are implemented or current systems are 
upgraded) -  How? 
 
11. Does it provide you with the assurance that you need? 
 
12. How would you describe the operational environment? (In order to determine if the view of the 
operational staff and management differ) 
 
13. Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? 
 
14. How often do you think the controllers need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific 
situation? How predictable are these situations and can they prepare for them? 
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15. Are you aware of how and why the controllers adjust their performance?  
 
16. Do you think they would do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment 
(dedicated check)? 
 
17. Does Work-As-Imagined/designed and Work-As-Done, and the difference therein, matter to you? If 
so why? 
 
18. Do you have a process/technique for understanding the success of everyday activity as a method for 
understanding failure? 
 
19. Do you use trade-offs as a measure of how safe the operation is? 
 
20. Have you identified a difference in data from the dedicated check to the continuous assessment? 
 
21. How do you use the assessor’s findings? (Please exemplify) 
 
22. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
23. How would you describe the linkage between Competence Assessment and the following four 
actions; 
o Monitor 
o Respond 
o Learn 
o Anticipate 
 
24. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? 
 
25. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
26. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
27. How do you assess the Competence Assessment in terms of making progress on safety? (and why) 
 
28. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
29. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview! 
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9.6 Appendix 6: Interview guide Malmö ATCC - ATCO 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
 
6. Could you summarise it in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
7. Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. 
If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one would 
you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
8. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
 
D) ATCO 
 
9. Could you briefly describe the way you work during a normal working day and one where you have 
your yearly competence assessment? Do they differ? - If yes, in what way? 
 
10. How would you describe the operational environment? Is the working condition stable (mainly 
routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? If yes, please give an example! 
 
11. How often do you need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific situation?  
 
12. How predictable are these situations? Can you prepare for them? 
 
13. Please give an example of how you adjust your performance 
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14. Could you specify the reason why you would need to adjust your performance? 
 
15. Would you do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment? 
 
16. Could you describe a typical situation (working with traffic) where you would trade-off thoroughness 
for efficiency? 
 
17. Would you do the same trade-off during a competence assessment? 
 
18. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
19. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? 
 
20. In your experience, how do you think the management and the safety department view the function 
of the Competence Assessment? 
 
21. In what way do they use the yearly findings? 
 
22. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
23. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
24. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
  
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.7 Appendix 7: Interview guide Malmö ATCC - ASSESSOR 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position?  
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence?  
 
6. Could you summarise it in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
7.   Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. 
If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one would 
you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
8. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
D) ASSESSOR 
 
9. Could you briefly describe how you work as a competence assessor? (Dedicated check) How were you 
selected? 
 
10. Do you use Performance Objectives? If yes, please give an example! - If no, why not? 
 
11. Do you have yearly focus areas? If yes, are these communicated to your colleagues? - If no, why not? 
 
12. Do you use the Scenario Interview? If yes, in what way? If no, - why not? 
 
13. What would you describe as characteristic findings in a Competence Assessment?  
 
14. How are these communicated to the colleagues? And to management? 
 
15. What do you do if there is competence in doubt? 
 
16. Do your colleagues get any yearly individual feedback? 
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17. How would you describe the operational environment? Is the working condition stable (mainly 
routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? Please give an example! 
 
18. How often do you see your colleagues adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific situation? 
How predictable are these situations? Can they prepare for them? 
 
19. Could you give an observed example of how your colleagues adjust their performance? 
 
20. Could you specify the reason why they need to adjust their performance? 
 
21. Would they do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a dedicated check? 
 
22. Could you describe a typical situation (that you have observed) where your colleagues would trade-off 
thoroughness for efficiency? 
 
23. Would they do the same trade-off during a dedicated check? 
 
24. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
25. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? – If no, why not? 
 
26. In your experience, how do you think the management and the safety department view the function 
of the Competence Assessment? 
 
27. In what way do they use the yearly findings? 
 
28. Is your expertise/experience used when performing safety assessments or when investigating 
incidents/occurrences?  
 
29. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
30. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done?  Please elaborate! 
 
31. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
32. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.8 Appendix 8: Interview guide Malmö ATCC - MANAGEMENT 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.  Please state your name and work position? 
2.  Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? Why dedicated check? 
 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
 
6. Could you summarise it in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
7.   Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. 
If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one would 
you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
8. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s) 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
D) MANAGEMENT 
 
9. Could you describe how you view the link between Competence Assessment and your role and 
responsibility as a Manager? 
 
10. How confident are you that the Competence Assessment Scheme provides you with a representative 
picture of safety in the operation? 
 
11. Do you use the Competence Assessment Scheme to assure yourself of changes in the operational 
environment? How? 
 
12. How do you anticipate or expect the Competence Assessment Scheme to support those undergoing 
the change? 
 
13. How would you describe the operational environment? (In order to determine if the view of the 
operational staff and management differ) Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it 
require a lot of improvisation? 
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14. How often do you think the controllers need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific 
situation? 
 
15. How predictable are these situations and can they prepare for them? 
 
16. Are you aware of how and why the controllers adjust their performance?  
 
17. Do you think they would do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment 
(dedicated check)? 
 
18. Does Work-As-Imagined/designed and Work-As-Done, and the difference therein, matter to you? If 
so why? 
 
19. Do you consider trade-offs as a means of assuring safe operation? If yes, in what way?  
 
20. Would the ATCOs do the same trade-off during a competence assessment? 
 
21. What contribution to lesson learning, does your competence assessment scheme make? 
 
22. How do you assess the Competence Assessment in terms of making progress on safety?  
 
23. Do you have a process/technique for understanding the success of everyday activity as a method for 
understanding failure? 
 
24. How do you use the assessor’s findings? (Please exemplify) 
 
25. To what extent, on a scale from 1-5, do you think Competence Assessment strengthen the 
organisation’s ability to anticipate and monitor change? 
 
26. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? – If no, why not? 
 
27. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
28. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
29. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
30. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.9 Appendix 9: Interview guide Inverness TWR - ATCO 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position?  
 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
 
4. Why the combination of dedicated check & continuous assessment? 
 
5. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
6. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
 
7. Could you summarise it in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
8. Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. 
If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, which one 
would you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
9. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
D) ATCO 
 
10. Could you briefly describe the way you work during a normal working day and one where you are 
observed as part of the continuous assessment? Do they differ? - If yes, in what way? 
 
11. How would you describe the operational environment?  
 
12. Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? If yes, please 
give an example! 
 
13. How often do you need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific situation? 
 
14. How predictable are these situations? Can you prepare for them? 
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15. Please give an example of how you adjust your performance 
 
16. Could you specify the reason why you would need to adjust your performance? 
 
17. Would you do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment? 
 
18. Could you describe a typical situation (working with traffic) where you would trade-off thoroughness 
for efficiency? 
 
19. Would you do the same trade-off during a competence assessment? 
 
20. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? 
 
21. In your experience, how do you think the management and the safety department view the function 
of the Competence Assessment? 
 
22. In what way do they use the yearly findings? 
 
23. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
24. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
25. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
  
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.10 Appendix 10: Interview guide Inverness TWR - ASSESSOR 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? Why the combination of dedicated 
check & continuous assessment? 
 
4. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
5. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? Could you summarise it 
in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
6. Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, 
which one would you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
7. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). What 
is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
D) ASSESSOR 
 
8. Could you briefly describe how you work as a competence assessor? (Combining dedicated check and 
continuous assessment)  
 
9. How were you selected? 
 
10. Do you have dedicated days for observations? (Targeted days or is it a holistic impression?) Do you 
observe all colleagues? 
 
11. Is briefing part of the concept? 
 
12. Do you use Performance Objectives? If yes, please give an example! - If no, why not? 
 
13. Do you have yearly focus areas? If yes, are these communicated to your colleagues? - If no, why not? 
 
14. Do you use the Scenario Interview? If yes, in what way? If no, - why not? 
 
15. What would you describe as characteristic findings in a Competence Assessment? How are these 
communicated to the colleagues? And to management? 
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16. What do you do if there is competence in doubt? 
 
17. Do your colleagues get any yearly individual feedback? 
 
18. How would you describe the operational environment? Is the working condition stable (mainly 
routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? Please give an example! 
 
19. How often do you see your colleagues adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific situation?  
 
20. How predictable are these situations? Can they prepare for them? 
 
21. Could you give an observed example of how your colleagues adjust their performance? 
 
22. Could you specify the reason why they need to adjust their performance? 
 
23. Would they do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a dedicated check? 
 
24. Could you describe a typical situation (that you have observed) where your colleagues would trade-off 
thoroughness for efficiency?  
 
25. Would they do the same trade-off during a dedicated check? 
 
26. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? – If no, why not? 
 
27. In your experience, how do you think the management and the safety department view the function 
of the Competence Assessment? In what way do they use the yearly findings? 
 
28. Is your expertise/experience used when performing safety assessments or when investigating 
incidents/occurrences?  
 
29. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
30. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done?  Please elaborate! 
 
31. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
32. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.11 Appendix 11: Interview guide Inverness TWR - MANAGEMENT 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
 
4. Why the combination of dedicated check & continuous assessment? 
 
5. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
6. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
 
7. Could you summarise it in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
8. Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, 
which one would you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
9. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). What 
is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
D) MANAGEMENT 
 
10. Could you describe how you view the link between Competence Assessment and your role and 
responsibility as a Manager? 
 
11. How confident are you that the Competence Assessment Scheme provides you with a representative 
picture of safety in the operation? 
 
12. Do you use the Competence Assessment Scheme to assure yourself of changes in the operational 
environment? How? 
 
13. How do you anticipate or expect the Competence Assessment Scheme to support those undergoing 
the change? 
 
14. How would you describe the operational environment? (In order to determine if the view of the 
operational staff and management differ? 
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15. Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? 
 
16. How often do you think the controllers need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific 
situation? 
 
17. How predictable are these situations and can they prepare for them? 
 
18. Are you aware of how and why the controllers adjust their performance?  
 
19. Do you think they would do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment 
(dedicated check)? 
 
20. Does Work-As-Imagined/designed and Work-As-Done, and the difference therein, matter to you? If 
so why? 
 
21. Would the ATCOs do the same trade-off during a competence assessment? 
 
22. Do you consider trade-offs (thoroughness & efficiency) to be a necessary part of assuring safe 
operation? - If yes, in what way? 
 
23. What contribution to lesson learning, does your competence assessment scheme make? 
 
24. How do you assess the Competence Assessment in terms of making progress on safety?  
 
25. Do you have a process/technique for understanding the success of everyday activity as a method for 
understanding failure? 
 
26. How do you use the assessor’s findings? (Please exemplify) 
 
27. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? – If no, why not? 
 
28. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
29. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
30. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
31. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.12 Appendix 12: Interview guide Inverness TWR - SAFETY MANAGER 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
Presentation of the aim and scope of the research project.  
The purpose and structure of the interview will be explained in detail along with the informed consent 
form. Statements and quotes will only be used in a way which ensures anonymity and solely after receiving 
acceptance from the involved informants. 
 
 
B) BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Please state your name and work position? 
 
2. Could you briefly summarise your work experience within the field of Air Traffic Control? 
 
C) GENERIC QUESTIONS TO ALL INFORMANTS 
 
3. Please describe the assessment method practiced here at your unit? 
 
4. Why the combination of dedicated check & continuous assessment? 
 
5. Could you describe your thoughts concerning the concept of Competence Assessment? 
 
6. What is competence to you?  How would you define/describe competence? 
 
7. Could you summarise it in 4 - 5 core competences? How is this measured? 
 
8. Introduce the picture “The Boxes” to the informant(s) and explain their associated 
implication. If you should place your units’ assessment approach/methodology in one of the boxes, 
which one would you choose? Please elaborate! 
 
9. Present and discuss the picture “The Assessment Environment” with the informant(s). What 
is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? (Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the 
performance of the ATCO? Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming 
competence?) 
 
 
D) SAFETY MANAGER 
 
10. How confident are you that the Competence Assessment Scheme provides you with a representative 
picture of the daily operation (and thereby also safety)? 
 
11. Do you use the Competence Assessment Scheme to assure yourself of changes in the operational 
environment?  
 
12. How do you anticipate or expect the Competence Assessment Scheme to support those undergoing 
the change? 
 
13. How would you describe the operational environment? (In order to determine if the view of the 
operational staff and management differ)  
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14. Is the working condition stable (mainly routine) or does it require a lot of improvisation? 
 
15. How often do you think the controllers need to adjust, customize, compensate or adapt to a specific 
situation?   
 
16. How predictable are these situations and can they prepare for them? 
 
17. Are you aware of how and why the controllers adjust their performance?  
 
18. Do you think they would do the same adjustment(s)/adaptation(s) during a competence assessment 
(dedicated check)? 
 
19. How would you describe the correlation between Work-As-Imagined/designed and Work-As-Done?  
 
20. Do you have a process/technique for understanding the success of everyday activity as a method for 
understanding failure? 
 
21. Do you consider trade-offs (thoroughness & efficiency) to be a necessary part of assuring safe 
operation? 
 
22. What contribution to lesson learning, does your competence assessment scheme make? 
 
23. Do you consider Competence Assessment to be a viable tool in identifying the gap between practice 
and procedure? If yes, in what way? 
 
24. In your experience, how do you think the ATCOs view the function of the Competence Assessment? 
 
25. Would you say that your units chosen assessment method/philosophy is presenting the organisation 
with a realistic picture of normal work/ Work-As-Done? (Elaborate) 
 
26. How do you weigh the Competence Assessment Scheme in terms of making progress on safety?  
 
27. If you were given free hands in designing and implementing an assessment method with the purpose 
of collecting vital data on Work-As-Done (Performance variability, performance adjustments, 
adaptation and the daily trade-offs), what would this look like? 
 
28. Do you have any additional comments or related topics you consider to be useful or relevant for my 
research connected to Competence Assessment? 
 
 
E) CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Would you approve that I can contact you again should I need to confirm, clarify or follow-up on the 
content of this interview? 
Please remember that you are very welcome to contact me should you wish to include further reflections, 
or if you wish to deepen or remove parts of your interview! 
Thank you so much for your time and willingness to participate in this interview!  
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9.13 Appendix 13: The boxes 
 
 
Informant Introduction: 
 
 The red box represents the mandatory prerequisite of assessing the competence of each 
individual ATCO 
 
 The blue box embodies an approach of creating awareness for further development of 
the individual ATCO and should be viewed as an add-on to the red box. The blue box 
thus symbolise a mind-set of actively increasing the ATCO’s consciousness pertaining to 
work performance. Further development of the individual is explored even though the 
ATCO is assessed as competent according to the defined performance objectives laid out 
in the red box.  
 
 The green box exemplifies a systemic focus which targets unit or systems specific issues. 
In this box the attention has shifted from an individual centred approach to a more 
holistic view of the functionality of the sociotechnical system itself. 
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9.14 Appendix 14: The assessment environment 
 
 
Informant introduction: 
 
What is the purpose of the Competence Assessment? 
 Is it to evaluate or investigate/understand the performance of the ATCO?  
 Is the focus placed on hunting errors or on affirming/confirming competence? 
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9.15 Appendix 15: Competence – coding of data 
 
 
 Skill-based competence 
 Knowledge-based competence 
 Experience-based competence 
 Adaptive competence 
 Service-driven competence 
 Social competence 
 
ATCO: 
 You should know the rules regarding our air traffic and our airspace. You should know 
the actual rules, so you have to brief yourself every day, once or two times a week to be 
up to date. And you should obey the rules where it is necessary and you should know 
when to break a rule. Don't misunderstand me but you should know when you have to 
do something to adapt the rules if there is a benefit for safety 
 It is competence to know and to be aware of what you are doing 
 A good mix of theoretical and practical work 
 Competence is not only to work safe, though safe is very important in our job. For 
competence it is also necessary to work in a normal speed.  
 I think you have to know what you do in the job and you must have enough experience. 
Of course you get more and experience the longer you work. The first year is very hard. 
You are often afraid since you do not know how to manage difficult traffic situations. 
You don't have the experience and you don't really know how it works. 
 I would say it is having a professional outlook, wanting to do your job to the best of your 
ability and ensure that you are equipped to do so, making sure you are up to date with any 
changes that are going on. 
 Competence is the ability to do the job you have been tasked to do. Doing the job you've 
been trained to do. You have the books and guidelines and try to keep it as standard as 
possible. It's pretty obvious. 
 It's the ability to use previous experience to safely manage any given situation to the best 
possible outcome for that situation. 
 Being able to perform your job according to the prescribed rules and regulations. It is also 
about cooperation and teamwork (E & P), that you help each other. 
 
o Core competencies; 
 Flexibility, Professionalism, willingness to continue to learn, to adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
  
87 
 I think it is an all-round thing. You need to get on with people you work with, 
follow the book, be as standard as possible, and be able to be flexible if 
something unusual happens. 
 Flexibility within a regulated framework. Knowing where the boundaries lie - 
pushing to the boundaries, but never exceeding them. It's knowing your job. 
 Knowledgeable, good at analysing situations, decision making. 
 
o How to measure? 
 By a feeling. By your knowledge of how you would work and maybe to compare 
it to others and how they work. I don't know how to explain it. 
 Could be useful to have someone from the outside coming in and checking once 
a year 
 Good question! Someone who is very experienced and who knows the game. We 
do need to be checked out, but how we should be checked out - I don't know! 
 It's not an empirical measurement. I don't know how you measure competency, 
but I know what it looks like when I see it and I know what it looks like when I 
don't see it. 
 As we do it today, especially with the new item - passed with remark. This can 
pick up recurring events or tendencies. 
 
ASSESSORS: 
 The ability to do the work in a safe and in a good way. It’s hard to describe what 
competence is because if you ask 5 people, you get 6 answers. On one side I have the 
impression that competence in our unit is to work fast and expeditiously. But that doesn't 
necessarily mean that you are competent. Because if it's fast and expeditious it's possible 
that it's not safe. On the other side if someone is working according to the book, 
according to the rules but not fast enough, then he's incompetent because he's slowing 
down the whole process. It's a mixture of both. Also the personality, he has to fit into the 
group of the day (the shift). It's not so easy to define competence, that's the problem we 
have with our training system as well (where is the level?). 
 An ability to demonstrate on a consistent basis the ability to undertake one's chosen role 
to an acceptable standard. 
 It is many different parts and all are important. You have to fit in socially and be able to 
adapt since you work with many different colleagues. Then there are of course the 
theoretical part. It is important for us to see that people feel comfortable and confident 
while working, especially if you are working part-time. There are many new rules and the 
operational environment can be quite complex.  And it is not just the new rules you need 
to keep up with, there can also be workarounds and best practices to make it smoother 
and this might not be written down anywhere. All this can be hard if you only work part-
time. 
 
o Core competencies; 
 Assertiveness,  confidence,  rapport, working in a team 
 Flexible, theoretical knowledgeable 
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o How to measure? 
 We do not have a definition of it, so how can we measure it! It is a feeling 
whether it is good or bad. 
 It almost comes to subjectiveness doesn't it, there is no figure obviously, one 
cannot state this in a book really or manual, it almost comes down to a gut 
feeling. (It is related to one's own experience). What you would do is measured 
against your experience and you measured against your own perception of what is 
an acceptable level of demonstrated ability. If you know how you would handle 
the situation, and at the same time relate it to the individual who may not be as 
experienced as you. But as long as it's still safe and that is really what you're 
looking for, but there comes a point where it's an overall perception of the picture 
they portrait. 
 We measure against the described training objectives for first validation of 
students. They are described in the Unit Training Plan. We have taken the main 
objectives and boiled it down to accommodate licensed controllers, but it is 
almost the same. 
 
MANAGEMENT:  
 Competence, on one side you know the procedures, you know how they work. And a 
social part, how to be with people, how to work in a team, react and actually being a 
strong part of the team (that you know the common way to work) 
 I'm not looking for somebody who can reach a standard on a given day, because there is 
an assessor behind him. And during that time he is under pressure and he is performing 
to his absolutely maximum for one reason - he has to do it for this 1/2 hour period of 
time. I want somebody who does this every day and that I as a manager has created an 
environment where I have ensured that his workspace and the development I have given 
him, the people he works with, the equipment he uses all comes together where he can 
apply his skills into an ongoing day to day service that has a continuous high standard 
rather than peaks. 
 Competency is to demonstrate the ability to perform a function in accordance with the 
rules and regulations. There are guidance and procedures that the controller has to work 
with. They have also got their training and background to interpret that information. So 
the competency, I suppose is to ensure that the level of service provision is consistent 
and meets the requirements of the legislation. 
 Competence is the thing you need to have to be able to perform your duties in a 
professional way. 
 That you are well-prepared and well-read within the required subject matters and that you 
can convert theory into practice. 
 
o Core competencies; 
 Comfortable, reasonable self-assured, confident that the service he's providing is 
of the required standard to provide a safe environment. 
 R/T competence - the ability to perform the radio transmissions, To be able to 
interact and manage a team, be able to deal with the issues of unusual 
circumstances (able to interpret emergency order), being able to interact with the 
management of the unit and feel open and honest in relation to incident and 
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accident investigation (being able to provide a competent record of what 
happened on the day or hour in question). 
 Knowledge, Skills, Situational Awareness, Flexibility 
 Good team member. Stress tolerant.  Ability to focus and concentrate during 
challenging scenarios. Ability to adapt. 
 
o How to measure? 
 That’s not easy! You can check that the colleague is doing sufficient spacing at the 
final and that each departure gets his requested flight level, these are hard facts! 
But the sense of competence is that you have to work like the whole community 
works that you fit together. That you’re one brick in the house! 
 That is a really tricky part. In a reactive way we can measure it by the reporting of 
occurrences and so on. But in a proactive way it is really hard to measure. You 
can measure it by looking at the amount of traffic handled without occurrences. 
Efficiency is absolutely one part of the competencies. 
 Through how this is done today, theoretical and practical assessment. 
 
SAFETY MANAGERS: 
 To me a competent person is one who can fulfil the required tasks above the average. 
You will get more competent with more routine, with more experience. Competence is an 
ongoing process it never stops 
 From an operational point of view it is acting and delivering in exactly the same way as 
you've been trained to do by a competent trainer. 
 
o Core competencies; 
 Correct R/T phraseology, correct application of procedures, Correct R/T 
discipline & correct management of de-confliction minima. 
 
o How to measure? 
 In my point of view, you cannot measure competence. Competence is always a 
judgement and there is someone who is judging if you are competent or not. The 
best judge to do it, is an open self-assessment. As an ATCO you should be honest 
enough to yourself and your colleagues if you are competent enough to work. 
 I would tend to go down the R/T sampling route or form. So how do we capture 
the errors, lapses whatever you want to call them? I would see a Colum by rule, 
those rules dictating exactly what you are looking for, where there has been some 
sort of error, lapse, slip - then you've got a scoring system alongside of that which 
gives you some sort of opportunity for trend analysis. Whether it is just a simple 
(- 1, 0 & + 1 or poor practice, standard practice & very good practice) then that is 
the sort of stuff that could be captured. And with the right sort of software you 
can do a trend analysis for the whole company where you can see a particular area 
where there are a trend or weakness and then we can do something about it. 
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